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Abstract 
 
The Smart City: A Rhetorical Analysis of Actors and Their Smart City 
Narratives 
 
Patrick James Russell, M.S.C.R.P. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Supervisor:  Robert Young 
Co-Supervisor: Steven Moore 
 
This thesis introduces and synthesizes the rhetorical narratives of smart cities—a 
burgeoning field of discourse and practice that adds another “layer” of infrastructure to 
urban form and function: information and communication technology (ICT). In this 
thesis, I will perform a rhetorical analysis of two primary actors involved in the smart city 
movement: corporate actors and academic observers. Rhetoric is discourse, and discourse 
wields power. Only by observing the multi-faceted rhetoric of the smart city’s arrival and 
development will we, first, come to lay bare what exactly is happening, and second, 
better direct and guide technological interventions in urban spaces towards goals that 
serve the greater good. Technology alone will not define the future; rather, urban futures 
will be determined by how competing social groups within heterogeneous societies and 
economies approach, embrace, and speak of the technology that increasingly defines 
urban form. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 A Smart City Primer 
 
[Smart City Scene 1] 
It is a hot, summer day, and I have my AC thermostat set to sixty-eight degrees 
Fahrenheit. So do one million other households, altogether straining the electrical grid 
and energy provider, which pulls energy from every source available. Luckily every 
household has a smart meter, which allows for “demand response.” The utility provider 
sends a signal to all those AC units, all one million of them: “0110001010101,” code for 
“500,000 cycle on; 500,000 cycle off; rotate and repeat.” By cycling this energy demand, 
the utility is able to not only decrease peak demand, but, more importantly, able to 
maximize the efficiency of existing energy sources. Such cycling creates a disincentive to 
build any new power plants using fossil fuels; given the maximally efficient use of 
existing plants, new ones are now rendered superfluous. 
 
[Smart City Scene 2] 
I wake early on a Monday, following my morning routine before I commute to work. 
What will it be today—personal automobile? light rail? a ride-share through a popular 
Transportation Network Company such as Uber or Lyft? I grab my smart phone and open 
my local transit app to check the congestion pricing for the day. Because it is raining, I 
imagine more people will be driving to work. I’m right—the highway charge for the day 
has tripled. I rather save money and avoid the traffic by taking the rail. This variable 
pricing introduces a surcharge into the transportation market when the usage of public 
resources, such as roads, overshoots its limited supply. Because of the real-time pricing 
mechanism, commuters will rationally select the most convenient means of transit to 
work, with the preference oftentimes leaning towards public transit and other available 
alternatives.  
 
[Smart City Scene 3] 
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My city would like to make a greater investment in green infrastructure, parks, and 
recreational opportunities for our residents, but we just don’t have the financial resources 
to do so. As we undergo various capital improvement plans, we decide to see if investing 
in new technology, primarily information and communication technology (ICT), to 
replace our aging infrastructure of water pipes and street lights can save us money. After 
all, we lose fifty percent of our potable water to leaks (IBM), and our street lights remain 
turned on at times when no one is even using the streets! As these pipes and lights are 
replaced, ICT sensors are attached. The LED lights are now motion-activated, only 
turning on fully when a car or human approaches at a given distance, and dimming 
slightly when no motion has been detected for five minutes; and the pipes, also equipped 
with sensors, suddenly alert the water authority to any leaks, no matter how minor. 
Instead of addressing only major leaks that disrupt service and ignoring all other leaks, 
the water utility’s operations have shifted to “preventive care.” Together these 
investments significantly reduce the operating budgets of the city, all because of gains in 
efficiency. Our city now redirects the savings towards investments that will increase our 
overall well-being while minimizing the cost of service to urban residents. 
 
[Smart City Scene 4] 
My city has always claimed to be democratic, but we citizens feel that our representatives 
are out-of-touch with our demands and goals. Because of our lobbying and advocacy for 
grass-roots democracy, they have decided to employ the use of ICT to experiment with 
being an “e-democracy.” With the help of our smart phones, we are now invited by the 
city to snap photos of places that we think need repair or maintenance—a crumbling 
sidewalk, a fallen tree, an ideal street for new bicycle lanes. The new city app not only 
uploads these photos to a public domain, but also pinpoints the GPS coordinates of where 
we take the photo, and invites users to post a short message of no more than 100 words 
about their photo. There are even rumors that City Council will begin soliciting feedback 
from us ordinary folk on important legislative matters, asking us to take surveys 
distributed through short message services (SMS) so that we, as the citizens of this place, 
can better direct their decision-making process. 
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[Smart City Scene 5] 
It is a dreary Wednesday evening, but I decide to go for a walk anyways. My 
neighborhood might appear to be a bit rough around the edges, but this is my home, and 
this is where much of my family and most of my friends live. I know this place and feel 
comfortable here. As I turn the corner onto the main street of my area, I bump into a 
dozen or so police officers, who have five other men facing the wall of a derelict building 
as they frisk these “suspects.” I ask what’s going on, and get told to get against the wall, 
too. When I ask why or what I did wrong, one of the officers quips, “You meet our data 
profile, son, now get against the damn wall.” Of course, they find nothing on me, nor on 
the five other men. Two weeks later I was reading the newspaper when I saw a status 
report on a recent investment made by our police department. Apparently, the county 
authorized a trial subscription to IBM’s crime data analytics software, which purportedly 
predicts when and where crime will occur based on a host of variables, including even the 
weather and time of day. It’s then that I put two and two together and realized that I and 
those other men had been profiled because a computer program said so.  
 
[Smart City Scene 6] 
The war never stopped in our country, and I had no choice but to abandon my home, my 
career, and my network of friends and extended family in order to protect my children. 
My spouse and I decided that we would sell everything we could to raise enough money 
for the trip. We had heard that for $10,000 per person, we could get to London, where 
there was no war, there was plenty of food, and my children could resume their studies. 
Hopefully my spouse and I could even find jobs after applying for refugee status. What 
we did not know before this trip began is that a xenophobic haze had fallen over England, 
and that the country had permanently suspended all of its immigrant programs, even for 
those seeking asylum from conflict at home. When we arrived in London in the back of a 
truck, hiding behind canisters of food destined for a warehouse, we began walking the 
streets. Confused and having no idea where we would go, I told my children to try and 
act as normal as possible, lest we attract attention to ourselves. Little did I know that we 
already had. Not ten minutes after jumping out of the tractor-trailer, half a dozen armored 
police cars sped to stop near my family and our fellow refugees. We were all handcuffed, 
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placed in the back of an escort truck, and transferred to a refugee facility that honestly 
looked like an old prison. On the way there, I overheard the soldiers sitting next to me 
expressing their awe at how fast and accurately the eye detection cameras installed 
throughout the city could recognize legitimate citizens and foreign, illegal immigrants. 
And I thought to myself how I had spent $40,000 and traversed a war zone to get my 
family to safety, only to be deterred by a surreptitious eye scan. 
 
[Smart City Scene 7] 
 Food, you know, is what keeps you alive. This might seem so obvious that you 
find me crazy for even mentioning it; but I mention it because it is so obvious that most 
of us forget! And why would we not forget? Hell, no one grows food anymore! I tried to 
be a farmer, just like my mother and father. They dedicated their lives I tell ya to trying to 
make a living from the fruit of the Earth. From sunrise to sundown, they would be out 
there in the field, tending to the vegetables that we would sell at local markets. They even 
got a grocery store in a nearby city to carry their produce. Put their pictures up on the 
wall, too, so that people knew where their food was coming from and who was growing 
it. But by the time I tried to take over, those big companies had already figured out how 
to grow food without people. There had been rumors that they were testing drones and 
using these advanced computer programs to monitor and manage crops, but you always 
imagine that stuff happening in a lab and not being about “real life.” Boy was I caught off 
guard. I just couldn’t compete with the cost. With just a few drones, some irrigation lines, 
an advanced software program called “iCrop,” and an automated, solar-powered 
combine, one company could farm a thousand acres. And that’s considered nowadays to 
be a small operation. So, millions of farmers like me are out of work . . . but at least your 
food is cheap, right? 
 
Welcome to the smart city—a recent discourse about urban space that has yet to 
completely define what it is and what it will lead to. The qualifier “smart” has overrun 
just about every facet of our lives—smart phone, smart watch, smart car, smart house, 
smart economy, smart everything! But why is it here? Why are we seeing a host of 
conferences dedicated to it, from the annual Smart City Expo World Congress held in 
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Barcelona, Spain to an increasing number of smart city conferences in the United States, 
including Smart City Week in Washington D.C. (September 2015), San Jose’s VERGE 
conference (October 2015), and Austin’s recent Smart Cities Innovation Summit (June 
2016). Why have we seen the US Department of Transportation’s widely popular Smart 
Cities Challenge, the winner of which (Columbus, Ohio) received a $40 million grant to 
become “the country’s first city to fully integrate innovative technologies—self-driving 
cars, connected vehicles, and smart sensors—into their transportation network” (“U.S. 
Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces Seven Finalist Cities for Smart City 
Challenge”)? Why has the University of Pennsylvania’s City and Regional Planning 
program created a SMART Cities concentration (“City and Regional Planning”)? Why 
are there a host of non-profits and advocacy groups dedicated to the smart city 
movement, with the most prominent being Smart Cities Council (Smart Cities Council)? 
And why have dozens of companies devoted significant R&D to this field, and, noticing 
that, why have academics devoted an increasingly significant amount of due diligence to 
the literature on smart cities? In short, why has the smart city become such a big 
movement (or buzz word) in such a short amount of time? 
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Table	  1.1:	  The	  Explosion	  of	  Smart	  City	  Scholarship:	  A	  Sample	  of	  Publications	  
	  
 
There has been an explosion of smart city scholarship in academic journals focused on urban planning. 
Two special issues have been released thus far—one in 2011 and one in 2015. 
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Table	  1.2:	  The	  Explosion	  of	  Smart	  City	  Scholarship:	  Conferences	  
	  
 
An upsurge in conferences focused on smart cities is also very noticeable. Many of these conferences seem 
to be sponsored by and targeting municipal actors, suggesting that “smart city” is already an established 
discourse (and sometimes practice) among some urban planners / managers. 
 
That depends on whom you look to. Unsurprisingly, the authors who romanticize 
the possibilities of the smart city dwell upon its purpose more so than those who critique 
its rhetoric and trajectories. Among this more hopeful crowd of enthusiasts, three hopes 
become apparent when reviewing their literature: 1) democratic revolution, empowered 
by the new channels of communication and learning made possible through ICT; 2) 
carbon-neutral economies (commonly referred to as “net-zero” emissions), achievable 
through the decentralization of networks (transportation, energy, water, heating and 
cooling, food), which is made possible (perhaps only made possible in the world as we 
know it today) through the communicative, data-driven power of information and 
communication technology (ICT); and 3) efficient municipal governance, enabling the 
cheaper and more effective delivery of public services through the analytical power of 
big data. A world of radically empowered citizens going about their lives in a radically 
sustainable economy—this is the goal of smart city advocates and some academics. 
But other interpretations exist, and the political and ideological ramifications of 
those interpretations depend on the observer’s positionality. Knowing that it could 
potentially be a $650 billion market/year (Townsend epilogue), corporations like IBM, 
Cisco, Accenture, Panasonic, Hitachi, and Siemens sell the smart city as the great, new 
infrastructure development of the 21st century, one that instrumentalizes the entire city as 
if it were a machine to be operated effectively and efficiently. Scholars and public 
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intellectuals, steeped in the theory (and reality) of neoliberalism, interpret that “corporate 
opportunity” as a potential threat to public spaces and services. 
While coined as a concept and practice around the year 2005 (Picon 9), the “smart 
city” movement has been slow to coalesce around a definitive mission, a specific 
definition, and a cohesive community of scholars, practitioners, companies, and 
enthusiasts. While the narratives remain numerous and, oftentimes, can be seen as 
mutually exclusive, what has become apparent is that the smart city is indeed different 
from the “sustainable city,” the “eco-city,” and the “green city.” Each of these latter 
movements concern themselves with design—eco-cities might favor passive solar homes 
and public plazas showcasing native permaculture; green cities explore the features of 
natural infrastructure systems that augment the resilience of ecosystems within urban 
centers; sustainable cities have given us solar and wind energy, and advocate for 
community gardens, composting, and bicycling. Each movement, that is, addresses the 
form, structure, and display of the city. But the smart city concerns itself with an invisible 
style of urban management that nevertheless has a substantive impact upon the visible 
world of our cities. It involves a socially constructed world of data, analytics, and 
information processing. This design we do not necessarily see, but it is certainly just as 
real. If it is already having an effect, should we not clarify what might be happening?  
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
 Because of the competing definitions and technologies either provided by or (at 
this point) imagined by actors, what the smart city actually is, and what it is to become, 
remains clouded in ambiguity. These actors tend to be defined by their perspective and 
positions in the smart city space, and include federal and municipal governments, 
corporations, academics, journalists, public intellectuals, and DIY techno-enthusiasts. We 
should ask and explore how their conceptions of the smart city differ. Around each actor 
exists a rhetorical space—the accumulation of a few years of stated and ulterior motives, 
assumptions, actions, and philosophies. This paper will seek to answer the following 
question: when closely examined, what vision of cities does each discourse suggest? How 
do these competing—or perhaps occasionally complimentary—modes of speaking about 
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technology and urban space vie for the rhetorical power to guide not only public talk, but 
also the physical and spatial outcomes of future urban development? 
 Sustainability, equity, economic development, safety, efficiency—these are 
common, laudable goals that city officials around the world will quickly speak of as they 
work to protect and improve the quality of life for their residents. And yet, beneath these 
ideals, cities are also sites of capital accumulation, where a steady labor pool and a 
frenzied pursuit of technological innovation permits the continued exploitation of their 
residents. The city as a contested space of gyrating forces applies just as much to any 
rhetorical movement supposedly here to “save the day,” as is commonly said of the smart 
city. 
 Only by observing the multi-faceted rhetoric of its arrival and development, 
however, will we, first, come to lay bare what exactly is happening, and second, better 
direct and guide technological interventions in urban spaces towards goals that serve the 
greater good. Technology alone will not define the future; rather, urban futures will be 
determined by how competing social groups within heterogeneous societies and 
economies approach, embrace, and speak of technology. The scales of this rhetorical 
tension will tilt more favorably towards one social group—the group that can most 
effectively “conquer” the meaning of the smart city as perceived by the public and all 
other actors. By alerting audiences in advance to the fact that “language matters” 
(Dryzek) for smart cities, I hope to tilt those scales towards an urban future that best 




 In this thesis, I will perform a rhetorical analysis of two primary actors involved 
in the smart city movement. Rhetoric is discourse, and discourse wields power in a 
twofold manner: 1) discourses “condition the perceptions and values of those subject to 
them, such that some interests are advanced, others suppressed, some people made more 
compliant and governable” (Dryzek 10); and 2) discursive power, especially in regards to 
the rhetoric of technology and urban space, literally has material implications for how 
cities come to be developed and redeveloped (Aibar and Bijker). 
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 I have chosen to assess the rhetoric of those that provide technological 
apparatuses bearing this smart city label—corporations—and those charged with 
describing and assessing events that unfold in our world—academics. For the former 
actor, I have also included municipal pilot projects that, while technically cities, are 
nevertheless corporately developed ones, and must therefore be included under this 
category. Each of these actors, writ large, represent a collection of smaller actors, and 
they, too, may have differences. Each group can be seen as heterogeneous, where 
disagreements and debates surely break out in city halls, corporate boardrooms, journals 
and at conferences. Nevertheless, their position in the smart city space suggests a 
foundational commonality that allows us to differentiate among them, looking for 
differences and similarities in the rhetoric they employ to describe smart city technology. 
 Each group can also be seen as loosely homogenous given their centripetal 
concerns and commonalities, with cities having to ensure the public welfare and safety of 
their populations, corporations having to capitalize on opportunities and turn a profit, and 
academics having to report on the events of our world and provide frames for better 
making sense of it. Whereas attention will be given to multiple discourses underway in 
each group, a dominant rhetoric does reach across each group’s spectrum of sub-actors 
and voices. And this rhetoric, as my theory will explain in detail, matters, in the most 
material sense of that word. Each of the “technological frames” associated with these 
actors compete and “strive for dominance” in the smart city space (Aibar and Bijker 15). 
The dialectical tension among these actors carries material implications. Mapping the 
current balance among these factions will guide my rhetorical analysis. 
 For corporate actors, I have selected IBM and Panasonic, two actors that occupy 
much of this for-profit space, but I will fill in my “corporate profile” with observations 
and anecdotes from other prominent companies, namely the companies behind the smart 
city developments of Songdo in South Korea, Masdar City in the U.A.E., and PlanIT 
Valley, or now referred to as Living PlanIT, in Portugual. While many corporations 
currently advocate their smart city interventions and are seeking to better position their 
products, IBM and Panasonic have already been involved in several pilot projects and 
have adopted the smart city as a path towards their respective corporate growth. For a 
quasi-municipal actor, I have selected a smart city development in Japan called Fujisawa 
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Sustainable Smart Town (FSST), constructed by Panasonic. Japan offers us a perspective 
from a fully developed country. My analysis of FSST and Panasonic stems from an actual 
visit there and online research, both of the company’s literature and other third party 
analyses.  
 For academics, where the literature is quickly becoming more expansive, I have 
organized my research according to two guiding questions: 1) What are the most read and 
cited books and articles on smart cities? I will assess the few monographs in English on 
smart cities, the most recent and critically acclaimed of which are Antoine Picon’s Smart 
Cities, Anthony Townsend’s Smart Cities, and Adam Greenfield’s pamphlet Against the 
Smart City; and 2) Where have conversations focused on smart cities occurred in an 
urban planning, academic context? I have located two journals in the urban planning 
space that recently published special issues on smart cities—Volume 18, Issue 2 (2011) 
of the Journal of Urban Technology and Volume 8 (2015) of the Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society. These special issues will be rhetorically reviewed. My 
familiarity with smart cities is also informed by my reading of a few planning-related 
journals that have published an article here and there on smart cities. I have primarily 
looked to the journals Cities, City, and Dialogues in Human Geography for these 
occasional articles. While not necessarily rhetorically assessed in this thesis, they inform 
my scholarship. I have included these sources under “Additional References,” in case my 
reader wishes to pursue more academic scholarship on smart cities. 
 These actors by no means capture all actors—whether real or potential—involved 
in the smart city space. I have selected corporations, and some of their pilot projects, and 
academics in order to narrow my research focus and to explore the interactions of what 
my research suggests are two broadly-defined “heavyweights” for smart cities. That said, 
one could also include many other actors in a rhetorical analysis of smart cities, 
especially those actors in civil society and the already developed cities that wonder if 
smart city ICT can help to solve persistent, wicked problems. Writ large, civil society 
actors include “the public”—how smart cities might be discussed in social circles in 
cities, at local conferences and networking events, on social media and digital platforms, 
and throughout other loosely defined but certainly impactful networks of social influence. 
One could also point to more clearly defined civil societies, such as professional 
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networks (as a fictitious example, imagine a Society of Smart Cities network), regulatory 
NGOs that might christen a technology or project as warranting the “smart city” label 
(consider an entity similar to LEED, for example), and trade groups that seek to stoke 
investment—both public, through universities or chambers of commerce, or private, 
through corporate R&D—in smart city development. All of these actors have had and 
will continue to have a measurable impact in the space of smart cities. It is my hope that 
this preliminary rhetorical analysis of some actors will spur further studies, so that 
collectively, our understanding of the discourse shaping technological urbanism today 





 Any inquiry into the fabric of our physical habitat warrants an explication of my 
underlying theories, a “showing my hand” so to speak. The structure of my analysis can 
be said to reflect the structure of a physical house or building. I have sought to lay a solid 
foundation, upon which I build everything else. I have support beams, frames, and 
stairways that allow us to move up, to make progress in assessing the smart city. And I 
have a roof, embellished with a rooftop deck that allows us to see far and wide, to place 
everything into context, and to understand the purpose of our analytical journey. Here is 
my “house of theory”: 
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Diagram	  1.3:	  House	  of	  Theory	  
 
 
My foundation is that rhetoric and the way we talk or chat matters. Different 
actors, or groups of actors, compete in the public sphere through rhetoric. From the 
conflict over race and Jim Crow between the late-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries 
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Saddam Hussein, competing actors’ differences were first and foremost circumscribed 
through words. If the tension remained unresolved, words often concurrently transformed 
into physical actions, whether violent or non-violent. Martin Luther King marched 
peacefully in the streets of southern cities; after his assassination, protestors burned cars 
and buildings. If one actor or an alliance of actors with semi-mutual interests successfully 
“crowded out” competing actors, marking their arguments as inaccurate, weak, 
delusional, etc., then the discursive victors marched forward full-steam-ahead. At the 
start of the US invasion into Iraq, George W. Bush and his administration had seventy-six 
percent of Americans on his side—competing anti-war or anti-invasion discourses had 
obviously failed. The public had listened and stood behind their president. 
John Dryzek demonstrated the actual weight and importance of rhetoric, 
especially as it relates to sustainability and environmentalism, in The Politics of the 
Earth: Environmental Discourses, published first in 1997 but currently, as of 2013, on its 
3rd edition. Dryzek begins his analysis of differing actors’ rhetorical response to the need 
for sustainability with a reflection on the power of words, of discourse. He reminds his 
audience that “contests over meaning are ubiquitous” (Dryzek 6) and matters as 
important as the environment, and cities I would add, “are subject to continuing dispute 
between people who think in sharply different ways” (Dryzek 6). Discourse is powerful. 
It carries material and profound psychological implications. In homage to the theories 
developed by Michel Foucault, Dryzek notes that “discourses can themselves embody 
power in the way they condition the perceptions and values of those subject to them, such 
that some interests are advanced, others suppressed, some people made more compliant 
and governable” (Dryzek 10).  
Dryzek further clarifies the epistemological and material intricacies of rhetoric 
and discourse: 
A discourse is a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in 
language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of 
information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts. 
Discourses construct meanings and relationships, helping define common 
sense and legitimate knowledge. Each discourse rests on assumptions, 
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judgments, and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, 
debates, agreements, and disagreements. ( Dryzek 9-10) 
Thus, if the centrality of rhetoric lays the foundation of my theory (# 1 in my depiction), 
the various kinds of rhetoric, and what they reveal about actors’ differing “assumptions, 
judgments, and contentions,” constitutes the pillars, beams, stairways, and support 
systems of my theoretical understanding of smart cities (#2 in my depiction). The sudden 
emergence of talk on smart cities is not just one talk, but many. Multiple actors have their 
own “coherent stories” about what the smart city is and its future implications. But 
beneath those stories, and the occasional rhetorical panache, lie assumptions that we 
should uncover and reveal. 
 Multiple rhetorics compete for the dominant meaning of “smart cities.” In my 
analysis of a few central actors—corporations, their pilot projects, and academics—I 
have identified a few dominant strains. While the smart city may seem “new,” actors’ 
modes of discourse and the assumptions or goals that undergird them have a long history. 
I do not delineate here exactly what these rhetorical strains are, and instead will explicate 
these discursive themes and their intellectual histories in the discussion sections of my 
thesis.  
 However, what I do wish to emphasize now and in greater theoretical detail is the 
nature of discursive conflict. I wish to call attention to how chatter, about any popular 
movement such as the smart city, consists of multiple discourses that compete against 
each other vigorously—whether openly or surreptitiously—for the mantle of that 
movement, or the powerful right to define what it is and will be. This is level #3 of my 
depiction above.  
 Within industries and cities, words compete. Cities bear the material outcomes of 
those rhetorical battles. Urban design, architecture, land use and zoning, demographic 
and economic spatial trends—all reflect bygone battles, debates, compromises, and 
defeats that occurred primarily through discourse. Several urban theorists help us to 
demarcate these battle lines and to understand how we approach it critically as scholars, 
including Eduardo Aibar and Weibe Bijker, Andy Merrifield, and Steven Moore.  
 In their 1997 essay, Aibar and Bijker turn to a historical case study of the urban 
extension of Barcelona beyond its walls in order to highlight how competing 
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technological frames from differing actors not only affected the eventual spatial outcome 
of the city, but also clashed amongst each other. These clashes revealed ideological 
fissures, through which we can spot rhetorical, philosophical, and socio-economic 
differences, confirming the authors’ suspicion that technology is anything but apolitical. 
It is itself a political instrument. Aibar and Bijker note that scholars now appreciate the 
complexity of technology in social and urban systems. They mark an academic emphasis 
“on the role of politics and cultural norms and values in the shaping of urban 
technological systems” (Aibar and Bijker 5). Technologies themselves, then, reflect and 
echo the social forces that led to their creation, refinement, and deployment. 
 Steven A. Moore, in his 2007 monograph Alternative Routes to the Sustainable 
City: Austin, Curitiba, and Frankfurt, credits Aibar and Bijker above with initializing the 
field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). Moore’s deference to Aibar and Bijker 
makes sense when he explicates the epistemological premise of STS: “As a branch of 
sociology and philosophy, STS investigates how and why particular technologies emerge 
in particular places at particular times in history” (Moore 3). Obviously, STS strips 
technology of any deterministic halos we might be tempted to confer upon it, as if 
technological progression is “natural.” Moore, Aibar and Bijker reveal that technology is 
anything but “natural,” and instead is situated within contexts—contexts that we should 
be aware of, given what they reveal about politics, assumptions, and motives. 
 Moore seeks to apply this heuristic to sustainability, which, like technology, is not 
as homogenous or black-and-white as one might first assume. Moore argues that 
“sustainability” is a “story line or plot,” cultivated most strongly by cities with active 
citizenry (Moore 1). Behind each story line, one could say, lies an entire cadre of 
philosophical support staff—assumptions, political leanings, desires, allegiances, etc. 
While no person is held prisoner to a single story-line, these discourses nevertheless hold 
significant sway over individuals and communities, not only affecting how the world is 
seen (and what remains unseen), but also literally shaping the physical environment in 
which humans (and other animals) will continue to evolve as a species (Moore 8-9). 
 Moore identifies three primary themes of public talk in sustainable development: 
political, environmental, and technological (Moore 12). Political talk arises because the 
“choices about which criteria for sustainability are best are social choices about how we 
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want to live, not scientific choices about what is true or more efficient” (Moore 13). 
Technology warrants our attention, he says, because “social habits,” which we could 
possibly change, nevertheless “coevolve with the technological systems that enable 
them,” and two, our social choices are limited by existing technological systems (Moore 
19). In regards to the spatial differentiation of technology, Moore emphasizes that there 
are multiple “competing stories that are employed by local interpretive communities,” 
and that these frames cannot move themselves to another place (Moore 20). Indeed, 
“interpretive frames are filters that are historically and spatially constructed by the public 
talk in particular places” (Moore 20). 
 Already, three central tenets of my theoretical foundation begin to emerge: 
1) Technology develops contextually. 
2) Reading that context reveals political allegiances, assumptions, and motives. 
3) Technologies and the ideas that shape them compete. 
a) Either different technologies compete; OR 
b) Different actors compete to define the meaning, purpose, and 
ramifications—i.e., the idea—of a technology. 
In regards to the first and second points, we must not take the rhetoric of smart cities at 
face-value, no matter the actor who is speaking or writing. We must look beyond the 
discourse to map the relational web of influences—targeted audiences, hidden motives, 
historical precedents, forgotten assumptions, and supposed mission statements. Discourse 
itself is a story, but beneath it lies another, unspoken story. Thus, uncovering context 
allows us to analyze academics’, cities’, and corporations’ approaches to smart cities in 
their entirety.  
 In regards to the third point, we can theoretically understand now that 
technologies compete since they do not unfurl in a vacuum. Rather, a context riddled with 
heterogeneous actors and their own assumptions, motives, and histories sets the stage for 
either interpreting a technology differently or proposing competitive, uncomplimentary 
technologies that instantiate the political differences of actors. In the first example, we 
might consider scientists’, politicians’, and the military’s contestation over the future of 
nuclear physics—peaceful energy or catastrophic weapon? With the latter, we can 
consider differing technologies to address CO2 emissions, where some actors propose 
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technologies that “capture” CO2 post-emission and other actors that propose eliminating 
most, if not all, human activities that produce harmful CO2 in the first place. Both 
instances reveal, again, that technology—and certainly smart cities—are anything but 
apolitical. The smart city is not one story, but a host of stories. At times, these stories 
might follow the same logic; but they might also contradict and even compete against one 
another.   
 But wait! Do we—as intelligent creatures gifted with speech, reason, and 
communitarian instincts—really want to argue that competition, contradiction, and 
confusion are central to the very fabric of our cities and the tools that make them work? 
To reference the “roof” of my theoretical depiction above (item #4), I openly share now 
my theoretical assumption that, yes, conflict and debate are central to the development of 
human space, but that in no way inhibits communities from [eventually] identifying 
mutual interests and goals. In these last few paragraphs of this section, then, I wish to 
address stages three and four of my diagram. I argue that technology and the city, and 
therefore the smart city, are contested and dialectical. However, I wish to also emphasize 
that such contest and debate and political tension mobilizes a movement towards a 
particular outcome. While no actor completely wins a discursive dialectical battle, the 
scales nevertheless tilt eventually in favor of one party, and that party has significant 
sway over how larger networks of actors come to define and understand a given idea or 
technology. Given the flux of discourse, the change of political winds, and the 
oscillations of power, no actor, of course, will command center stage permanently. The 
dialectic is always in flux. But one can nevertheless wield influence here and now, when 
arguably we need it most. 
 Andy Merrifield, in his Dialectical Urbanism: Social Struggles in the Capitalist 
City, presents a theory for cities that embraces conflict and tension, specifically the 
tension between urbanism and urbanization. The former speaks of humans, social bonds 
and interaction, cultural creations, the formation of individuals and families—the “finer 
things in life” that one can often find, see, and experience in cities. The latter speaks of 
industrialism and capitalism, of the exploitation of readily-available labor that tends to 
flood cities and that fixates surplus value into fixed assets such as real estate and 
“innovation districts.” These two dialectical forces cannot be separated from each other. 
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Indeed, “urbanism is [therefore] a political experience because it’s an experience bound, 
shaped, and defined by a profoundly dynamic and imperceptible process,” or 
urbanization (Merrifield 9). Against the force of capital, where cities, like oiled machines 
at the factory made to churn out commodities and produce surplus value, stands the 
possibility “that cities burn with an infernal flame and that disorder is indeed part of the 
metropolitan experience” (Merrifield  13). He reiterates throughout his case studies that 
“this dialectic cannot nor should not be resolved; it’s a contradiction that needs to be 
harnessed somehow, not collapsed; worked through, sometimes lived with, not wiped 
out” (Merrifield 14). Indeed, despite the fact that “the city fulfills a functional role within 
the capitalist system,” the city, at the same time, is also a “place where people live, 
establish communities, raise kids, and put down roots” (Merrifield 155, 156).  
 I emphasize the dialectical nature of cities—sites of capital accumulation, and yet 
also places where people live and communities emerge—because of what we will find in 
our rhetorical analysis of smart city actors. These largely competing, and sometimes 
complimentary, urban visions both underlie various smart city narratives. Few actors, 
especially outside of the academy, openly preface their smart city manifestos or analyses 
with a declaration of which side of the urban dialectical coin they fall on. Thus, by 
accepting the contested nature of urban space, we prepare ourselves to read between the 
lines, and map the political-economic allegiances and assumptions of smart city actors. 
 Merrifield by no means wishes to suggest in Dialectical Urbanism that the tension 
of countervailing forces in cities are to be embraced as an unavoidable reality that unfurl 
according to mysterious forces. Rather, residents, community leaders, and even socially 
conscious businesses and institutions can play an active role in reshaping that tension, or 
guiding it, to produce desirable results for the community or city. He proposes that “we 
need to think through what sort of urban disorder and experience should be lived with 
and inured—no matter how painful and shocking—and what should be eradicated. And, 
while we’re at it, what sort of politics and political institutions we can invent to make 
these choices” (Merrifield 16). That is, we—as inhabitants of a place or as socially-
interested folks wishing to enter the fray—can project future goals and, with strategic 
thinking, coalition building, and crafty ingenuity, nudge the oscillating tension among 
urban forces towards that goal. In short, urban dialectics do not necessitate the abolition 
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of political goals. Rather, they encourage the formation of good ones that can possibly 
outmaneuver other ideological frames and urban visions in this “contradictory and 
ambiguous” dialectical dance (Merrifield 28).  
 I have adopted a political goal in my analysis of smart cities, one that a rhetorical 
analysis serves well. This political assumption speaks to the “apex” of my theory diagram 
(again, item #4 above the “house of theory” depiction), and it will conclude this theory 
section, tying it all together. I have looked to Ivan Illich to elucidate my political stance 
and include its explication in my theory section given my understanding that little, if 
anything, can be apolitically described. Much in the vein of Merrifield, Illich sees two 
possibilities for the use of science and technology: 1) industrial bureaucracy and 
capitalism further expanding through science and technology, with humans simply aiding 
that expansion; or 2) science and technology serving and augmenting the creative 
capacities of each person’s talents. Whereas “the first leads to specialization of functions, 
institutionalization of values and centralization of power,” the latter “enlarges the range 
of each person’s competence, control, and initiative” (Illich xii). The latter only comes 
about through political limits, and incites the emergence of a “convivial” society, “in 
which modern technologies serve politically interrelated individuals rather than 
managers” (Illich xii). This term, “convivial,” designates “a modern society of 
responsibly limited tools” (Illich xiii).  
 Despite persistent conceptual vagueness, we know what smart cities are 
materially: the physical application of tools, machines, software, and—most 
importantly—real-time algorithms to physical space. This technological apparatus may 
serve—in part or in whole—industrialism’s march, whereby variable capital succumbs to 
the cheaper “labor” of fixed capital, or machines, that then redirect profits to the 
privileged few. Alternatively, this incredible technology may serve the individual and the 
communities they comprise, imbuing them with life-giving assets to pursue freedom, 
“survival, justice, and self-defined work” (Illich 13). Are smart cities just a “mode of 
corporate production” that “establishes a radical monopoly not only over resources and 
tools but also over the imagination and motivational structure of people” (Illich 96)? Or 
will smart cities augment each person’s talents and encourage the cultivation of 
“competence, control, and initiative” (Illich xii)? 
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 Only through two collective efforts will that question be resolved. First and 
foremost, we must understand the various discourses currently occupying the smart city 
space. We must not only map them, compare and contrast them, and critique them, but 
must also perform deeper analyses of their respective assumptions, motives, and political 
allegiances. Second, after such rhetorical analyses, we can then ask whether or not a 
particular conception of the smart city, or even a particular technology or material 
intervention in urban space, actually serves what I find to be a more palatable conception 
of the city—a place where people are to thrive and flourish, where social, economic, and 
environmental progress can be pursued vigorously, but still in multifarious ways 
(Moore).  
 With this introduction of the multiple rhetorics of smart cities, the identification 
of the actors I will be assessing, and the clarification of the theories that guide my 
analysis, I will now turn to language of corporate and academic actors, as spoken on their 
terms. Chapter two explores, reviews, and analyzes the rhetoric of corporations and their 
pilot projects. Chapter three will address academic actors in a similar fashion. I have 
adopted a neutral tone in the literature reviews, as I wish to have these actors speak on 
their own terms. The findings sections presents my rhetorical assessment in tabulated 
form, and in the discussions, I imbue my analysis with appeals to theory. 
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2.0 Smart City Pilot Projects and Corporate Actors 
 
 These literature reviews bring together materials associated with actors I have 
identified in specific spheres—the corporate and the academic. The intent is to aggregate 
in representative sets of discourse what is common to these spheres of influence. While 
heterogeneous differences will be noticed by the reader among these sub actors, a 
persistent and prominent theme should become apparent as one reads through my 
rhetorical analysis of the applicable materials. Recall that the goal of such an exercise is 
to allow us to parse the smart city discourse into multiple narratives, according to actors’ 
assumptions, ideologies, ulterior motives, and political-economic dispositions. The 
literature reviews, however, seek to present the discourse of these actors on their terms, 
whereas my analysis of the “discourse behind the discourse,” so to speak, will be 
reserved for the discussion sections. Between each literature review and discussion will 
be a findings section, which will present tabulated discourse analyses with concise 
explanations.  
 
2.1 Literature Review of Corporations and Pilot Projects 
 
 In my literature of corporations and some of their pilot projects, I first turn to the 
big three smart city projects, all of which have received considerable fanfare and press. 
These include Masdar City, which lies outside of Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.; Sondo, which lies 
next to Icheon Airport, not too far from Seoul, South Korea; and Living PlanIT, which 
originally began as a utopian development in Portugal called PlanIT Valley, but appears 
to have since become primarily a business product. I then turn to Panasonic’s first and 
flagship pilot project, Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town, located in Fujisawa, a distant 
suburb of Tokyo, Japan. Next, I explore two corporations involved in the smart city 
space—Panasonic and IBM, with an eye towards their corporate strategies for smart 
cities on the global stage.  
 
2.1.1 Pilot Projects 
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 Articles have recently begun to appear en masse that catalogue the social, 
economic, political, and spatial implications of “from-scratch” smart cities. Known as 
“greenfield developments,” or “cities” built literally from the ground up within the past 
15 years, these developments include Masdar City in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 
Songdo in Icheon, South Korea, and PlanIT Valley in Portugal. These three cities have 
received enormous press and fanfare (and a few critiques) across the digital medias. After 
all, in addition to being clean, new, and visually futuristic, they personify an enticing 
rhetoric that urban planners and citizens alike tragically remain susceptible to: an utopic 
future, where all societal issues are solved by careful spatial planning. For example, see 
how Masdar City describes itself:  
The low-carbon development of Masdar City has an integral role in 
transforming Abu Dhabi’s economy from an oil foundation to one with a 
knowledge and innovation base. It serves as a centralised test bed for 
global renewable energy and technology companies. The city itself is 
designed to maximise convenience and reduce environmental impacts. 
(“Sustainability”) 
Such a description portends a future that is novel, revolutionary, and, importantly, ideal 
and comfortable to human habitation. It will be a place that is not only environmentally 
sound, but economically astute. And, to boot, it will be a convenient place to live, 
perhaps foregoing the unaffordability or traffic and other issues of previously successful 
cities. 
 Masdar City describes itself as “the world’s most sustainable eco-city,” and will 
pioneer a “’greenprint’ for how cities can accommodate rapid urbanization and 
dramatically reduce energy, water and waste” (“About Masdar City”). But its core, as 
described through its marketing materials, is its innovative enterprises. Much as the block 
quote above hints, Masdar City clearly seems to interpret its undertakings as an economic 
initiative. Indeed, neighborhoods grow around the centripetal Masdar Institute of Science 
and Technology, which “extends a spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship throughout 
the city” (“About Masdar City”). This economic allegiance makes itself clear, too, with a 
prominent tab on the website advertising the city’s economic “free zone,” incentives 
pertaining to international capital flows that allow relocating corporations to forego 
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domestic interference from the U.A.E. Benefits include (“Benefits of Setting Up in 
Masdar Free Zone”): 
 
1. The freedom to operate with 100 percent foreign ownership and no partner in the 
United Arab Emirates; 
2. The ability to move capital and profits outside the UAE without restrictions; 
3. No import tariffs, corporate taxes or individual taxes; 
4. Zero currency restrictions; 
5. And a strong framework of intellectual property protection.  
 
 Songdo and PlanIT Valley—two other greenfield developments—also 
grandiosely state their purposes. While PlanIT Valley was originally meant to be an 
actual physical city that, by attracting ICT campuses and investment, would become a 
economic cluster around smart city development, it seems to have become more of a 
single business venture focused on selling IoT (the Internet of Things) software. As they 
state on their website, “The PlanIT Urban Operating System™ is the smartest, most 
flexible way to converge infrastructure with a world of sensors, devices and people across 
developments of scale and entire cities. A single intelligent system to manage it all” 
(Living PlanIT).  
 And there is much to be analyzed. Living PlanIT claims that their integrated 
software system allows actors across all scales (residents, building managers, utilities, 
and governments) to achieve “massive savings” through shared intelligence, which 
allows for the more efficient operation of infrastructure. As explained on the “How It 
Works” webpage of their site, their advanced operating system can make “sentient” the 
physical space of one’s apartment or home. Sensors that measure “light, temperature, 
movement, and humidity” and wireless devices that control one’s appliances are all 
connected to a central platform. Anonymous data (they claim) from these individual 
apartments or homes can then leap to a higher tier data-analytics and control, at the 
building or block level. At this scale, “current conditions and historical data are used to 
provide efficient building systems management and predictive operation. The result? 
Reduced cost, less waste, and safer, smarter, more convenient spaces” (“How It Works”).  
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 The goal of such analytics is nothing short of revolutionary changes in the fabric 
of human society. Or so it seems. Living PlanIT’s elevator pitch reads as, “The Internet 
of Things is springing to life. And we’re at the heart of it. Through our technology, 
expertise and partners, we’re creating efficiencies, realizing revenue, increasing 
sustainability, and opening doors to new ways of building and living. We’re not just 
envisioning the future, we’re making it happen right now” (Living PlanIT). And the 
operating system that will carry forward this revolution is the “smartest.” Everything—
from cameras, voice recognition, security, healthcare, energy systems, traffic, the 
weather, pollution, water quality, lighting, water treatment—can now be brought 
together, “efficiently and intelligently.” And for the first time ever (“What We Do”).  
 Just as Living PlanIT’s motus operandi centers around a business venture, so, too, 
does Songdo, which markets itself as an Oceanic economic cluster zone, focused 
exclusively on the ICT industry. Indeed, just notice the development’s tagline: “3.5 hour 
flight to 1/3 of the world’s population” (Songdo IBD). Their efforts seem to be much 
more successful than Masdar and PlanIT Valley—as of late 2015, Songdo proper is home 
to 36,000 people in the core business district, with another 90,000 living in “greater 
Songdo” (“A South Korean City Designed for the Future Takes on a Life of Its Own”). 
Technically an “International Business District,” its website proudly claims that this is 
“where the future of cities is taking shape . . . and residents, businesses, and visitors are 
contributing to the growing ecosystem” (Songdo IBD). Its corporate and international 
tenants include United Nations offices and agencies, including the Green Climate Fund 
and the Global Green Growth Institute, and smart city technology providers such as Cisco 
and IBM. 
 Songdo’s three selling points include living, working, and visiting. I quote them 
exactly. For living, the advertising material online reads, “Connected homes in a vibrant, 
dynamic community: Life in Songdo offers the invaluable luxury of green spaces, high-
quality education, a varity [sic] of dining and retail options and a pedestrian- and bike-
friendly environment” (Songdo IBD). The quote is accompanied by a picture of a man 
golfing. In regards to working, the website visitor reads that, as “an established and ever 
growing international business ecosystem, Songdo is making a mark in industries like 
high-tech, bio-medical, IT, manufacturing, retail, and leisure” (Songdo IBD). And to top 
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it off, Songdo is a place to visit for outsiders, given “the hottest music acts, world-class 
athletes, [and] heads of state,” the website reads. It continues with a generous 
invitation—“we invite you to join visitors like these from around the world. Take in the 
architecture, the fine dining, and the energy of Songdo’s spectacular setting” (Songdo 
IBD).  
 These three “cities”—Songdo, Masdar, and PlanIT Valley—are well known now 
in the smart city literature given their aspirations, whether for overall size (Songo is now 
a legitimate city of nearly 100,000 people) or their seemingly Kuhnian proposals to 
redefine urban life (PlanIT’s software programs). But, as the meaning of “smart city” 
continues to evolve and morph, hundreds of other interventions have begun to come into 
our purview. Indeed, Japan alone probably has around two hundred pilot projects 
underway, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has itself 
sponsored, funded, and monitored four big-press projects in selected cities. These four 
projects alone targeted thousands of households, received several billion dollars in grants, 
and involved the participation of dozens of technology, utility & energy, transportation, 
and real estate companies (Pham).  
 A project that has interested me is Panasonic’s Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town 
(FSST), a brownfield development nearly complete in the Tokyo suburb of Fujisawa, 
Japan. Officially opening in November of 2014 and to be completed by 2018, FSST will 
house six hundred smart homes and four hundred smart apartments (Pham). Unlike pilot 
projects covered above, Panasonic’s FSST is a brownfield development, as it sits atop the 
site of a decommissioned Panasonic television factory. Panasonic claims that this 
residential development will reduce CO2 emissions by seventy percent when compared 
to 1990 levels and attain thirty percent of its energy needs from renewable sources. It also 
intends to reduce residential water usage by thirty percent (compared to 2006 averages) 
and provide three days of energy in the case of an emergency. These features warrant its 
landing on the “smart” list (and perhaps even lists of “green cities” or “sustainable cities” 
given the breadth of its approach to residential living).  
 On its website, FSST claims that it not only demonstrates a “state-of-the-art smart 
town,” but also portends the “ultimate ideal” of what a town can be. Interestingly, FSST 
seems to differentiate itself from other smart city projects that have primarily emphasized 
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technologically enhanced infrastructure. FSST explains that its primary and first concern 
“was to create a concept for a smart community lifestyle based on residential comfort, 
regional characteristics, and future living patterns ‒ taking into account such aspects as 
energy, security, mobility, and wellness” (“Project Overview”). Only after these variables 
were identified did the community’s planners then ask how technology and smart 
infrastructure might allow them to augment these primary goals. 
 FSST operationalizes five town services, which together demonstrate what this 
“ultimate ideal” for a town really is. They include energy, security, mobility, wellness, 
and community. With photovoltaic panels installed on each of the six hundred single 
family homes and community solar on public land, “the Fujisawa SST project will 
provide energy services designed to perfectly complement lifestyles through to the next 
generation, enabling residents to generate the energy that they use in their own homes, 
through optimal utilization of solar power generation and other tools” (Fujisawa SST 
Council 7). Power consumption will be automatically managed and optimized by a 
“Smart HEMS,” or Home Energy Management System (Fujisawa SST Council 8). This 
HEMS not only efficiently and effectively manages energy production and consumption 
(e.g., storing unused solar energy in household batteries, or imperceptibly raising the Air 
Conditioner temperature to lower peak demand), but it also visualizes the flows of 
energy. Advanced ICTs have also been mobilized to create an “invisible” gated 
community. Eschewing the “cloistered unease” of physical gates, FSST’s “virtual 
gate”—a collection of surveillance cameras and LED street lights with motion-detection 
sensors—maintains a “warm” and “unobtrusive” atmosphere among residents and 
[permitted] visitors (Fujisawa SST Council 11-12). ICT has also been tapped to disrupt 
the mobility patterns of residents, with FSST intending to offer “entirely new total 
mobility services,” including shared, electric cars, a bicycle network, a rental car delivery 
service, and battery stations. These solutions, FSST claims, will alleviate pressing social 
problems like “traffic gridlock,” all by creating “a flexible and comfortable relationship 
between residents and their cars” (Fujisawa SST Council 13). 
 Unlike the pilot projects covered before FSST, which emphasize their 
technological aspects almost to the exclusion of their more organic components, FSST’s 
last two stated town services include wellness and community. In regards to wellness, 
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Panasonic obviously sees an opportunity to leverage ICT for data purposes, but the stated 
mission of this service has a strong human element, too. The marketing literature speaks 
of the need for “elderly care facilities, assisted residences for the elderly, pharmacies, 
home care services, clinics, nursery centers, after-school day-care centers, cram schools, 
etc.” (Fujisawa SST Council 15). Indeed, an architectural rendering of these public 
facilities emphasizes how they are placed side-by-side to each other, so as to incite 
intergenerational socialization and communication—a culturally-sensitive issue right now 
in Japan, one of the most urban and rapidly aging countries in the world. And yet, we 
should remember, a rapidly aging society also warrants a shift in corporate strategy. One 
wonders if these gratuitous spaces for building social bonds belong to the public, or are 
rather conduits for elder-tailored products and services that come with a price tag. 
 Lastly, in regards to community, FSST proposes an information exchange portal, 
where residents can access local services, communicate among each other, and also 
monitor—and compare—their household energy habits. FSST again emphasizes non-
technological engagement as an indicator of community health, pointing to 
predetermined community activities, such as neighborhood meetings, and/or community 




 Recall that FSST is a creation, or product, of Panasonic, a corporation with a 
market capitalization of $22.9 Billion, ranked as the 245th most valuable company in the 
world (“#245 Panasonic”). Its mostly electronic products include most items involved in 
the construction and furnishing of technologically advanced homes in highly developed 
countries—vacuum cleaners, washers and driers, refrigerators, air conditioners, LED 
lighting, solar photovoltaic panels, air purifiers, digital cameras and sensors, personal 
computers, mobile phones, surveillance systems, lithium-ion batteries, bicycles, etc. 
(“#245 Panasonic”). In other words, Panasonic can basically provide most of the items 
that residents will find in their FSST homes.  
 Panasonic makes no secret of the corporation’s intentions. The company has a 
website and corporate division dedicated entirely to “smart city solutions.” Short, 
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assertive, and confident words mark the webpages of their clean and slick marketing 
materials: predictive, adaptive, responsive, smart, connected, sustainable, secure, safer, 
greener, better. Panasonic claims that these qualities are available now through its 
CityNOW platform, whereby “modern society [is] dramatically transformed by 
intelligent devices, real-time data and responsive infrastructure. People [are] empowered 
by the instantaneous delivery of information and services that allow them to live happier, 
more sustainable, and more fulfilling lives. That’s the power of Panasonic Smart City 
Solutions. That is the power of NOW” (Panasonic City Now).  
 Panasonic, in what has become a very competitive and possibly lucrative industry, 
obviously seeks to dominate the smart city market. The company advertises solutions for 
family residences and small offices, energy providers and utilities, the health and 
wellness industry, transportation services, and building management systems. 
Furthermore, all of these marketing materials are provided in English—a curious fact for 
a company headquartered in one of the most racially homogenous countries in the 
world—Japan. But the use of English perhaps makes sense when one scrolls to the 
bottom of the homepage of Panasonic’s Smart City Solutions website, where one will see 
pictures and links to its two pilot projects: Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town, which is 
now fully operational and which I covered above, and Panasonic’s next project, currently 
in the planning phase. Where might this latter project be? In North America, just outside 
of the City of Denver, Colorado. There, “Panasonic is helping the city of Denver [to] 
create a brighter future” (“Panasonic is Helping the City of Denver Create a Brighter 
Future”).  
 Panasonic expressly states that its goal for Denver is “to bring a number of similar 
solutions [from FSST] to the 400 acres Transit Oriented Development project near Pena 
Station, as well as to Denver International Airport” (“Panasonic is Helping the City of 
Denver Create a Brighter Future”). Pena Station will be a mixed-use development just 
one light-rail stop away from the Denver airport. The 400 acre site will be anchored by 
the new Panasonic Enterprise Solutions headquarters. The CEO of the Denver 
International Airport, Kim Day, states that this “transit-oriented development as Pena 
Boulevard Station validates the mayor’s vision of an aerotropolis: the airport serving as a 
catalyst for regional economic development” (“Panasonic is Helping the City of Denver 
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Create a Brighter Future”). The crux of Day’s reference, of course, draws upon John 
Kasarda’s research into globalized cities made competitive and defined by their ease of 
international travel and trade. He coined the term “aerotropolis” and defines it as “a new 
urban form where cities are built around airports speedily connecting time-sensitive 
suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and business people to distant customers, clients, 
and marketplaces” (Aerotropolis).   
 Another prominent player in the smart city space, of course, is technology 
stalwart International Business Machines Corp. (IBM). Founded in 1911 and with a 
current market capitalization of $142.7 Billion (“#41 IBM”), IBM and its CEO have 
explicitly identified the smart city as the 21st century opportunity for corporate growth. Its 
homepage for smart cities introduces the concept as “new cognitive approaches to long-
standing challenges.” Links to further essays and videos include phrases such as “new 
initiatives for entrenched challenges,” “cognitive government,” “next generation of 
buildings,” “the future of cities,” and “efficiency on campus” (“Smarter Cities: New 
Cognitive Approaches to Long-Standing Challenges”). The company’s product 
offerings—what it terms “solutions”—are numerous, and include general categories 
common to municipal operations, such as public safety solutions, smarter buildings, 
urban planning, government and agency administration, water and energy, transportation, 
social programs, healthcare, and education. Each of these general categories includes a 
half dozen or so specific interventions enabled through ICT and data analytics. 
 Much like Panasonic, IBM’s rhetoric employs carefully chosen words that point 
forward and that solicit affirmation. The homepage confidently states, “The world is 
moving to cities, fast and for the long term. In a cognitive era, cities themselves are 
moving: evolving, ever-changing, not fixed on a marked destination. We are at an 
important point in that evolution, as new forces emerge and combine to create new ways 
for cities to work” (“Smarter Cities: New Cognitive Approaches to Long-Standing 
Challenges”). These new forces will instigate improvements in “security,” “service 
delivery,” “efficiency,” “citizen engagement,” “business environment,” and 
“personalized experiences” (“Smarter Cities: New Cognitive Approaches to Long-
Standing Challenges”).  
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 A Marketing Portfolio Manager for IBM’s smart city Government Solutions states 
that “For the past several decades, major success stories from within the social services 
sector have been somewhat scarce. The complexities of intergenerational poverty, aging 
populations, addiction, abuse, unemployment, homelessness, rising health care costs and 
tightened budgets have exceeded the capacity of existing programs” (MacIsaac). But big 
data and software analytics, he claims, can allow us to breakthrough these challenges. 
Data analytics will open up new perspectives and create new frameworks to “better 
understand connections and identify gaps” in knowledge (MacIsaac). Consider the case 
study this IBM employee shares, whereby software tools analyze “1,000 factors that 
combine to impact youth unemployment” so that social workers can better identify at-risk 
youth who may drop out of school and become a drag on the social safety net: 
In the UK, the Medway Youth Trust is using predictive analytic models to 
reverse the downward spiral of youth unemployment by working to 
identify youth who are most at risk for dropping out of school or losing 
their jobs. With 6.2 percent of young people between the ages of 16 and 
19 in the Medway area neither in school, training or employed, and 
realizing the staggering societal costs over the course of a life for a youth 
who slips through the cracks, the Medway Youth Trust set out to identify 
and then intervene on behalf of youth most at risk. 
 
Central to the initiative is a propensity model that’s based on more than 
1,000 factors that combine to impact youth unemployment. Any youth 
that’s identified with a greater than 60 percent chance for ending up 
neither employed or in education or training is targeted for intervention 
based on documented analysis of root causes. One year into the program, 
positive outcomes were reported for 51 percent of the 723 individuals 
initially identified as at risk. 
 
Early findings revealed a 250 percent improvement in the accuracy for 
identifying at-risk youth versus the previous and time-consuming method 
of manually reviewing records. While the Trust is continuing to refine and 
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sharpen its focus on the types of interventions that are most effective, the 
model has produced evidence that interventions work and that the earlier 
in a person’s life the interventions occur, the more effective they are. 
(MacIsaac) 
IBM also prominently advertises another smart city vertical—The Next 
Generation of Buildings—on its homepage. Written by an executive and licensed 
architect with the smart city cadre of solutions, the article notes that human habitable 
structures have always been on the upward trajectory of smartness. Like evolutionary 
theory with a teleological end, human structures have been steadily improving down 
through the ages. Now is different, though. He notes that:  
Unlike previous forward advances on the trajectory of building 
management, the angle of the current path has veered sharply upwards—
away from incremental improvements and towards thoroughly 
transformative possibilities. Advanced analytics is lowering maintenance 
costs, cutting energy consumption, reducing the carbon footprint, enabling 
a more efficient use of space, and improving quality of life. (Phillips)  
 Interestingly, in this particular article and nearly all others on IBM’s website, the 
particular mechanics of how the immense collections of data from sensors can first be 
sifted through and then productively used to inform the management of various systems 
(building, urban, etc.) goes unspoken. Rather, it seems to be a phenomenon that just 
happens; verbs describing these actions already possess the present and present perfect 
tenses. “Advanced cognitive and analytics capabilities are enabling the aggregation of 
data and revealing a depth of understanding” and “descriptive analytics creates [sic] the 
foundation for another level of predictive capabilities that leverage ongoing and historical 
data” (Phillips). Notice, too, that the passive voice of this statement seems to remove us 
humans from involvement with this technology, thereby granting smart city tech a “life of 
its own,” it seems. And who are the winners of this shift to ICT enabled management and 
planning systems? “Buildings, building owners, investors, tenants, cities, and the entire 
planet.” And the purpose of this revolution? Not “because it’s the right thing to do or 
because it’s good to know. We do so to realize a transformative outcome, and that’s the 
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point of advanced cognitive and analytic building management.” What values (if any) 
and ulterior motives lie behind such language? 
 
2.2 Rhetorical Findings—Assumptions, Expressions, & Basic Entities 
Recognized 
 
 In this section, the rhetoric of corporations analyzed in the above literature review 
has been tabulated. In the primary table, the rhetoric of each corporate actor / pilot project 
has been assessed according to four key questions:  
1. What are the basic entities recognized in this actor’s discourse? 
2. What assumptions are made about the composition of or the processes that 
constitute cities? What is assumed to be “natural” about urban space? 
3. Who are the agents in this actor’s rhetoric, and what power (or lack thereof) are 
they imbued with? What are their goals, or, alternatively, what might a powerless 
agent receive? 
4. What are the key rhetorical devices, words, themes, and concepts employed by 
this actor when describing the smart city? 
While this section, “Rhetorical Findings,” presents the data in tabulated form, the next 
section, “Discussion,” explores these findings in a more conversational and detailed form. 
 The last table seeks to uncover the most commonly employed words as these 
actors market their smart city visions. I have taken all the language from the webpages I 
specifically cited above, and run all those words through a simple word-counter software. 
For words that were mentioned the same number of times, I have grouped them under the 
appropriate rank.  
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 Songdo, Masdar City, Living PlanIT, Panasonic, and IBM seem to have much in 
common. All reduce the complexity of cities and their inhabitants to “society” or “city.” 
Very few call attention to the actual, heterogeneous needs of residents. If residents are 
mentioned, they are usually presented as a homogenous, idealized hominoid tapped in to 
technological futurism. Another prominent entity recognized, of course, are the 
corporations themselves, which can provide solutions to persistent urban dilemmas. 
Common rhetorical ploys include themes, words, and concepts that point forward to the 
future, where ideal and state-of-the-art cities can be imagined. Indeed, this future is said 
to be natural, evolutionary, and inevitable. Progress will happen.  
 Note, too, how corporations and entrepreneurs were often imbued with action, 
whereas cities and their residents were passive recipients of that action. The only possible 
exception to these rhetorical tendencies is Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town. FSST 
explicitly began its narrative with the needs of residents. While technological hope, one 
could say, can be found in FSST’s discourse, note that it comes after specifying the 
unique needs of these residents in suburban Tokyo, Japan.  
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 The purpose of this table is to highlight common words employed by corporate 
actors and pilot projects as they seek to write their own smart city narratives. While some 
lexicon is predictable—residents, people, service—the predominance of certain words for 
each actor opens our eyes to their rhetorical angles into smart cities. For example, is it 
any accident that IBM’s most prevalent word is “data” when we recall that it is the largest 
data analytics firm in the world? Likewise, does it not make sense that Songdo’s most 
used word is “international” when we recall that the development’s primary purpose is to 
be a “business district” that provides access to one third of the world’s population 
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through a major airport? Like subtle clues, these core words point to underlying missions 




 In this section, I pair my rhetorical findings with the theories I discussed and 
explored in my theory section. Having uncovered the basic rhetorical intent of these 
corporate actors and pilot projects, I now wish to expand these findings into fuller form, 
employing theory to connect dots about the motives, ideologies, and assumptions lying 
behind the marketing campaigns of these international corporations and their projects. 
 The theories I explored above in my theory section allow us to peer behind the 
smooth advertisements and marketing materials of these corporations and cities to make 
sense of what, exactly, is going on. One would not be mistaken to group together Songdo, 
Masdar City, and Living PlanIT, which was initially often referred to as a place—PlanIT 
Valley—but seems to have shed such spatial roots given the complexity, obviously, of 
building a city from scratch. I find them to be “quasi-places,” in that, unlike a spatial 
experience I might have in Yellowstone National Park or even on the streets of New 
York City, the space itself in Songdo, Masdar, or PlanIT Valley (if it ever comes to exist) 
is an economic product.  
 Recall Andy Merrifield’s notion of the city as dialectical—urban space embodies 
the contradictory confluence of two primary, oftentimes competing forces, that of capital 
accumulation and that of human bonding and cultural creation. Respectively referred to 
as forces of urbanization (capital) and urbanism (“beauty and an abundance of life,” 
Merrifield says in homage to Jane Jacobs), the city is and has been the fulcrum between 
these dialectical, contradictory forces (Merrifeld 114, 14). The spatial reality, however, of 
these corporately developed “cities” seems to completely ignore the “softer” side of 
cities—Merrifield’s notion of urbanism—and instead seem to exclusively accentuate and 
privilege the forces of urbanization.  
 Recall, too, Merrifield’s definition of “lean urbanization,” which is the 
transformation of governance and daily life into a corporate system. It is “a city measured 
typically by its ability to balance its budget, to operate efficiently, and to maximize its 
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service provision—to maximize at minimal cost” (Merrifield 93). As we have seen, it is 
not just these three cities that make such claims, but other corporate parties active in this 
thoroughly economic space. Note, for example, IBM’s application of words, phrases, and 
concepts common in corporate discourse to its conception of the city, its problems, and 
the solutions to those problems. Things move “fast.” We are at an “important point” that 
demands a hardline response. We must make the processes of cities “efficient.” Persistent 
social problems must be solved using new frameworks and strategies. We must delegate 
tricky tasks that humans have failed to implement, or that humans implement 
ineffectively, to better-performing (and cheaper) productivity tools, such as software 
systems or robots.  
 These promises from the corporate actors reviewed in this thesis obviously reflect 
Lewis Mumford’s insights from his critical essay “Utopia, the City and the Machine.” 
Much like Plato’s rigid idealization of the city as a machine that can be optimally 
tinkered with—as if the right dash of this and that ingredient or the perfect setting of this 
or that instrument—Songdo, Masdar, PlanIT, IBM, and, at times, Panasonic portray the 
city as a utopic machine that can be fully known. No variable will remain unknown, these 
actors suggest, and with such omniscience and omnipresence, omnipotence logically 
ensues. Mumford referred to this assumption as “machine thinking,” an idea that he finds 
especially prevalent today, post-industrial revolution. Machine thinking assumes that the 
world can be “completely under scientific and technological control” (Mumford 279). As 
many academic critics of the smart city will point out, such naivety was brought into high 
relief through modernist urban planning, which failed miserably.  Is it not ironic that the 
same logic of a dismissed urban philosophy and practice has been resurrected today, but 
because of its shinier clothes and glistening guise, the smart city fanfare has drowned out 
such historical inconveniences? 
Mumford presciently predicted how this machine thinking would come to frame 
and direct social practices in highly developed urban spaces today. Whereas machine 
thinking in Plato’s time meant the enslavement or specialization of humans and their 
crafts (Mumford 285), machine thinking today is the way we conceive of our worlds and 
adopt “thousands of useful mechanical and electronic inventions” to monitor, regiment, 
and control our individual and collective lives (Mumford 288). In conclusion to his dark, 
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prophetic essay, Mumford worries that the Machine itself has become the very goal of 
humanity’s collective imagining of what the city should be. The danger, of course, is that 
this Machine may become a “totalitarian system” that trumps all other narrative 
conceptions of what the city could be (Mumford 290).  
 Some may find Mumford’s prophetic warnings too dismal or pessimistic. And 
perhaps they are. But if we latch on to what Mumford means by this Machine trumping 
all other competing visions of the city, so much so that it can never be “challenged, still 
less modified” (Mumford 290), we come to notice a persistent absence of discourse 
across much of these marketing materials from corporate actors—ordinary people. Again, 
the “other side” of Merrifield’s dialectic suspiciously lacks voice in my analysis of 
Masdar’s, Songdo’s, PlanIT’s, and IBM’s digital materials. The assumption is that the 
social, political, and cultural technics of people—which, needless to remind ourselves, 
are not all the same across space and time—will naturally fall into place once a 
corporation designs a city the “right” way.  
 Steven Moore, too, reminds us in his work that we should worry when only one 
narrative dominants the meaning of concept or practice, whether that be “sustainability” 
or the “smart city.” When the corporations above speak of “challenges” faced by cities 
and the technologically-enhanced “solutions” that they can offer, they each seem to 
universalize these situations. There is one problem faced by cities, and there is one 
solution (their products). This gesture towards singularity is a rhetorical ploy by 
corporations to grant scientific legitimacy to their claims. To quote Moore again from my 
theory section, urban planners must always remember that the “choices about which 
criteria for sustainability are best are social choices about how we want to live, not 
scientific choices about what is true or more efficient” (Moore 13, emphasis added). To 
grant objectivity to urban complexity and possible solutions is to efface the myriad social, 
cultural, environmental, and political economic uniqueness of a given place and time.  
 This absence of alternative, non-corporate actors (and it could have been as 
simple as interviews of city residents living along with, or under, these smart city 
regimes) carries political implications. As Eduardo Aibar and Wiebe Bijker demonstrated 
in their article on technological interventions in nineteenth-century Barcelona, spatial 
forms and processes reflect and instantiate competing actors’ power and ideologies. Aibar 
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and Bijker claim that “different rival technological frames strive for dominance” (Aibar 
and Bijker 15), and I believe that the rhetoric and discourse being employed by these 
corporate smart city actors is meant to substantiate their view of the city, one that is not 
just a Machine as Mumford warned, but, as a logical conclusion to that, one that is to be 
built, serviced, and operated by corporate, for-profit inventions. 
 The hyperbole of needing to quickly solve “wicked” social problems could be 
construed as a coordinated drumbeat among corporate actors to generate interest in this 
hot new topic of smart cities. They appear to have been successful thus far, as even a 
cursory glance at what cities, from large ones like New York City to small utilities in 
rural America, reveals thousands of mayors and municipal departments proudly donning 
the nomenclature of “smart ________” behind their cities’ name. Such hyperbolic calls 
for urban [re]development have been seen before. In an astute research essay on 
westward expansion, William Cronon wrote of “Booster Dreams.” In this essay, Cronon 
catalogues the real estate mania that drove urban speculation, and some urban 
development, in the western frontier during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
A philosophical determinism, explicated in part by Frederick Jackson Turner, drove this 
mania. Just as humans had evolved towards rationality, so too would our world evolve, 
from wild land and then pastoral landscapes, to eventually the “manufacturing 
organization with city and factory system” (qtd. in Cronon 31). Urban speculators would 
buy up land all throughout the West, and boisterously proclaim that the confluence of this 
creek and that river would be the next New York City of the hinterlands.  
It may be fair to say that a similar mania has overtaken the corporate narrative, at 
the very least, on how technology will transform urban space. While some actors’ 
narratives (such as some academics or some civil society groups) might be more reserved 
in their proclamations and predictions on smart city interventions, many of the 
corporations and pilot projects I have analyzed in this thesis seem to be over-stating what 
they can feasibly accomplish. Just as Cronon recorded that “the search for the great 
western cities of the future drove nearly all nineteenth-century townsite speculation, and 
the accompanying rhetoric always inclined toward enthusiastic exaggeration and self-
interested promotion (Cronon 34), so, too, could the idea of a utopic, Machine-driven, 
perfect urban space be driving the increasingly enthusiastic and exaggerated rhetoric of 
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some smart city narratives. Recall the narrative shared by the IBM employee about the 
next generation of buildings. Like the western notion of a “Great Chain of Being,” his 
underlying assumption is that buildings have “naturally evolved” towards greater and 
greater complexity, and the most complex buildings—and therefore the best—are here 
today. Lucky us. 
 What might be the risk of this one-sided narration of smart cities? So what if 
corporate actors seem to be demarcating what the smart city will be and how it will 
unfold? To return to Ivan Illich, who I looked to theoretically to uncover the purpose of 
cities (which, at its most basic level, is ‘human habitat’), one could argue that the rhetoric 
largely seen above from the likes of Songdo, Masdar, PlanIT, IBM, and a bit of 
Panasonic eschews the “convivial society” that Illich defended so vigorously in Tools for 
Conviviality. Recall that a convivial society is one that “enlarges the range of each 
person’s competence, control, and initiative” (Illich xii), where “modern technologies 
serve politically interrelated individuals rather than managers” (Illich xii). As seen in the 
marketing and descriptive materials of the interventions proposed by these corporate 
actors and some of their pilot projects, the entities behind these technological 
interventions remain anonymous. One can only assume that, of course, they are elite 
managers, either from for-profit or governmental institutions. Take IBM’s case studies, 
for example. Reading through its descriptions of how advanced analytics will prevent at-
risk youth from dropping out of schools or will optimize the mechanics of a building, one 
cannot help but imagine a privileged individual sitting behind a computer screen.  
 Even if the data of these advanced analytics were to be made publicly available, 
left unsaid in the corporate narratives explored above is how those analytical structures 
are formulated. What variables are identified and, alternatively, what variables are 
ignored? To return to Aibar and Bijker, the obtuseness of a rhetoric can be a carefully 
chosen tactic to silence competing actors or to solicit acquiescence from unsuspecting 
actors. The scientific community has in the past employed this nefarious discursive 
practice to circumvent public accountability. Aibar and Bijker refer to such a practice as 
technologically-induced semiotic creations, which are languages that not only describe 
technologies, but allow for the manipulation and control of those technologies. The 
engineers’ rhetorical emphasis on hygiene and their corresponding technological 
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interventions entailed social policies meant to elevate their knowledge and expertise in 
nineteenth-century Barcelona, and therefore circumvent addressing deep-seated socio-
economic stratification. So, too, might the silence around the construction of advanced 
data analytics—“it is very complicated,” corporations might say, “so leave these matters 
to our experts”—be meant to circumvent public debate and conversation about socio-
economic issues. 
 My reader may have noticed that I have somewhat resisted lumping Fujisawa 
Sustainable Smart Town and Panasonic with Songdo, Masdar, PlanIT, and IBM. I have 
indeed done so because I detect a shift in rhetoric with FSST. While certain elements may 
indeed be similar (recall, for example, the egregious bragging of creating an “invisible 
gate” using ICT to “protect” the community), FSST nevertheless takes care to emphasize 
throughout its digital materials that people and their quality of life matter, and that any 
technology deployed in the pilot project should serve that concern. As I stated in my 
assessment of FSST, the planners of Panasonic’s first smart city pilot started with the 
goal of creating “a concept for a smart community lifestyle based on residential comfort, 
regional characteristics, and future living patterns ‒ taking into account such aspects as 
energy, security, mobility, and wellness” (“Project Overview”). Thus, only after they had 
conducted this scenario-planning exercise did they then ask how advanced technologies 
might support such development goals.  
 Note, too, that FSST took into account “regional characteristics.” Indeed, the 
homes and garden alleyways among them are intentionally positioned to maximize 
natural wind flow, thereby minimizing the usage of air conditioners. This attention to 
“passive design” implies FSST’s recognition that primitive interventions are just as 
valuable as technologically advanced ones. FSST states that passive design enables 
“comfortable living with minimal burden on energy resources,” and that it respects 
“traditional knowledge about homebuilding” (“Town Services—Energy”). Such practical 
wisdom might not be monetized by Panasonic, but the corporation nevertheless finds it 
valuable to its pilot development. 
 The corporate actors and pilot projects above largely present a reductive 
worldview in their smart city narratives. I am concerned about the power dynamics of the 
agents in cities—corporations innovate and solve problems that cities and citizens have 
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simply been unable to solve because of their lack of technology. Furthermore, while I can 
foresee commonplace solutions for some aspects of cities across the globe (such as 
energy or mobility), the large corporations I analyze above fail to recognize the difference 
and heterogeneity of cultures and socio-economic circles. Furthermore, the pilot projects 
I analyze, with the possible exception of Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town, fail to 
recognize the contested heterogeneity that invariably arises within individual cities 
themselves, no matter the illusion of top-down, perfectly engineered control.  
 Other actors exist, though, in this smart city space, and I will now turn my 
attention to academic actors. Might these actors follow the same rhetorical path of 
corporate actors? Or are there differences? If so, are those differences subtle or more 
pronounced? As I have done above, I will first recount these academic actors on their 
terms, attempting to allow them to speak as they do in their respective publications. I then 
tabulate my assessment of their rhetoric in the findings section, and next analyze those 
findings according to some helpful theories for making sense of their rhetorical angles. 
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3.0 Smart City Academic Actors 
 
In this literature of academic actors engaged in the narration of smart cities, I look 
primarily to the most referenced and complete collections of smart city analysis. This 
includes two mongraphs (one published via a popular press and the other published via 
academic presses), one pamphlet (published as a free eBook), and two peer-reviewed 
special issues for prominent journals in the broad field of urban planning. I begin with 
Anthony Townsend’s Smart Cities, and then turn to a book bearing the same title, by 
Antoine Picon. The last book I assess is Adam Greenfield’s pamphlet Against the Smart 
City. I then turn to peer-reviewed articles, focusing exclusively on two prominent special 
issues. The first one, the Journal of Urban Technology, published a special issue in 2011. 
The second special issue was published in 2015 and comes from the Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society. Following these literature reviews, I will present rhetorical 




The “king” of smart cities and governance is without a doubt Anthony Townsend, 
whose Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia (2014) 
served as a megaphone for the empowering possibilities of information and 
communication technology when in the hands of ordinary citizens of an urban space. 
Nate Berg does a Q&A interview with Anthony Townsend in a recent MIT Technology 
Review, where Townsend’s overriding argument is that the direction of smart cities—
whether they will turn our lives into technocratic regiments or expand the creative and 
social capacity of urban life—depends upon to what extent the public embraces 
information and communication technology. He thinks the public will embrace the smart 
city because of smartphones, which he considers to be the most important urban tech. 
Townsend envisions the urbanites of cities each having a smart phone, “networked 
supercomputers” that can aggregate many helpful services (Berg 63). Tools like 
smartphones will decentralize power, create redundant infrastructure, increase social 
interaction, increase sustainable behavior, and incite creative energy (Berg 63). As an 
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example, he points to the sudden and disruptive impact of smart phones upon 
transportation. The network of smart phones is now “the best transportation sensing 
network in the history of mankind,” and we discovered it “completely by accident” (Berg 
64). 
 Townsend more clearly spells out this on-the-ground vision of smart cities in his 
monograph, which catalogues the infiltration of big data and technology into the fabric of 
our cities, noting its benefits, its faults, and its potentialities. The digitalization of our 
cities, and their transformation into “smart cities,” appears to be inevitable, with some 
“50 billion networked objects” connected to the Internet by 2020 (Townsend 3). 
Townsend does not shy away from this inevitability, though. He sees it as a challenge to 
which we must decide how we will respond. Citing Patrick Geddes throughout the book, 
he calls for a few things to guide smart cities’ development around the globe: 1) good 
governance that serves the people and that avoids blind infatuation with the glistening 
toys of smart cities; 2) an open-source approach to smart cities that solicits the creative 
intelligence of the people who actually live there, instead of the wholesale 
standardization of smart cities through the global sales teams of a few corporations; and 
3) a balancing of smart city tech with an interdisciplinary, “soft” urban planning 
intelligence that is more of an art than a science.  
Why do we need this softer touch? Townsend likes to draw parallels to the 
standardization of urban areas in the early 20th century, especially in regards to the 
personal automobile. That standardization, and the vast infrastructure eventually built to 
accommodate the car, seemed logical, reasonable, and rational at the time, but it is a huge 
problem that we now wrestle with. As he says, “If the history of city building in the last 
century tells us anything, it is that the unintended consequences of new technologies 
often dwarf their intended design” (Townsend 14). This is why Townsend references 
Patrick Geddes and Jane Jacobs so often—he legitimately fears that tech will literally 
program spontaneity and on-the-ground, individual-driven networks of exploration out of 
existence.  
But again, this big data, upon which smart cities are built, is here to stay and it 
will transform urban planning and city halls. Quoting John Tolva (Chicago’s Chief 
Technology Officer, an increasingly common position across cities), Townsend argues 
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that governing and policy making will now be based on what “vital signs” are telling us 
in real time, and not just anecdote (Townsend 211). Whereas problems in neighborhoods 
could not have been uncovered unless a public forum was provided, urban issues can now 
be discovered, assessed, analyzed, discussed, and even responded to instantaneously 
(assuming municipal staff remain employed to actually resolve them).  
Ultimately, though, even Townsend must acknowledge the necessity for some 
top-down delivery of municipal services, especially in regards to energy. When covering 
the appropriate realms of large-scale government and corporate smart city initiatives, 
Townsend turns to the smart grid. He reminds us that “electricity, even more than the 
digital data it conveys, will be the lifeblood of smart cities” (Townsend 35). Representing 
$1 trillion of public/private investment, the USA power grid has never really been 
updated (Townsend 35). While three quarters of American electric meters will be smart 
meters by 2016 (Townsend 38), the grid itself still needs a major overhaul. What makes 
our current grid inefficient is the split between base load plants and peak plants; a smart 
grid, through load shifting and load shedding, might allow us to focus entirely on 
developing clean base-load plants (Townsend 39). Together, loading shifting and 
shedding could reduce electricity needs by 10% (Townsend 40). Simply put, the creation 
of a smart grid will never be citizen-led. A smart grid for any sizeable city necessitates 
large expenditures of capital, centralized-planning, and a managerial class (corporate and 
government) who intimately understand electricity. 
 This recognition that both styles of governance are needed in the smart cities of 
the future—both “base-superstructure” and “superstructure-base” interventions—is the 
compelling insight of Antoine Picon’s Smart Cities: A Spatialised Intelligence. Picon 
argues that cities need both top-down and bottom-up approaches to effectively implement 
smart city solutions, and the sooner actors move past this false dilemma, the better. 
Indeed, Picon states that tech directives issued from municipal managers and grassroots 
activism are actually mutually supportive of each other.  
 Picon encourages his readers to realize that “there are some fields, albeit limited 
in number, where a neocybernetic type of management seems preferable to citizen 
engagement” (Picon 90). Take, for example, the energy grid, whereby ICT can 
automatically adjust a household’s thermostat to decrease peak demand, or smart urban 
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mobility systems, whereby a tenth of existing cars could meet the needs of 99% of an 
urban populace through automated ride-sharing. It is through such centrally-controlled 
systems as these that “the desires and experiences of spontaneity and collaboration” can 
then flourish (Picon 84). These centralized services, that will be admittedly controlled by 
a select few, create platforms for individual and community freedom. Ultimately, Picon 
proposes smart city advocates adopt “a form of city intelligence” that is “both widespread 
and focused,” diffuse among all urban inhabitants and their tools of collaboration and 
participation, and yet also concentrated in control rooms and command posts that keep a 
city functioning materially (Picon 100). 
Despite his pragmatic defense of smart cities, Picon does spend considerable time 
tracing its historical antecedents. He finds similarities with the discourse of cybernetics 
from the 1950s and 1960s (Picon 67). This rhetoric and practice expressed a “desire to 
anticipate and master everything” (Picon 67). And this desire must rest upon “a resolutely 
reductionist view of humankind and the world,” one that “made sense” to militarized, 
hegemonic discourse that pitted the “evil empire” of the east against “shining armor of 
freedom” of the west during the Cold War (Picon 69, 69-78). 
 However, to Picon, the connection to militarized and reductionist cybernetics is 
only a temptation, not a necessity. While that temptation is certainly real, dangerous, and, 
according to historical precedent, a constant plausibility, it need not define the future path 
of smart cities. Indeed, while neo-cybernetics and the current instantiation of the smart 
city might “rely on the same type of digital infrastructure based on sensors, chips, 
wireless transmission, information processing units and databases” (Picon 68), the smart 
city also (and perhaps more so) leans towards “the notion of a city that sets out to 
reinvest its citizens with the capacity spontaneously to invent community living” Picon 
67). Ultimately, as we saw above, Picon proposes that the neo-cybernetics of 
“controlling” or “commanding” a city is not mutually exclusive from the spontaneity and 
individuality made possible through smart city technology (Picon 100).  
 What we begin to see with Picon then is a more expansive understanding of 
technology. Eschewing “the twin pitfalls of unbridled enthusiasm for technology and 
blanket criticism—two attitudes which are unfortunately all too common in relation to 
digital matters” (Picon 20), Picon adopts a strong pragmatic framework for evaluating 
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both the dangers and possibilities of technologically-advanced urban planning. Indeed, 
despite even his own reservations with the smart city, he still calls the smart city 
movement a “turning point,” one that, despite its foreseeable disadvantages, will 
nevertheless usher in a host of advantages, which he amply catalogues in his book (Picon 
20). The smart city will bring us a “different future” . . . but perhaps with the vigilance 
and activism of the academic community, it can be a future “rich in promise” (Picon 
156). 
The most critical monograph of smart cities is Adam Greenfield’s Against the 
Smart City. A pamphlet published for free on the internet, Against the Smart City 
critiques not the use of technology in urban planning, but rather the vision of a city 
mobilized by the corporations that stand to gain from selling this “smart” technology. 
Indeed, Greenfield, who purportedly spent several years reading through corporate 
advertisements, marketing materials, pamphlets, interviews, and trade reports, finds their 
urban utopic visions to be naïve and deeply flawed. The predominant error Greenfield 
finds in corporate visions of smart cities revolves around a persistent and systemic 
misperception on the corporations’ part—they each fail to recognize the complexity of 
cities, and they remain blinded by the naïve simplicity of now-debunked modernist urban 
planning.  
While Greenfield’s pamphlet obviously caters to a nonacademic audience given 
its conversational style and its medium of publication (digital and free), one can infer the 
appropriate theories that lie behind this notion of cities as sticky, protean, rhizomatic, 
messy, and—in a sense—somewhat unknowable, uncontrollable, and unplannable. Cities, 
much like the entities who build and reside within them, morph and change in organic 
ways. Unfortunately for the smart city and its potential benefits, Greenfield argues that 
the conversation is being dominated by just “one particular story,” the corporate story 
(Greenfield Loc 56). And that limits people’s rights to plan their own and collective 
urban futures. 
What is so wrong with these “canonical smart cities” that Greenfield walks us 
through rhetorically? What fault does he find with IBM’s Rio de Janeiro Operations 
Center or Songdo or Masdar City or PlanIT Valley (Greenfield Loc 109, Loc 133, Loc 
145)? The flaws are numerous. First, these quintessential poster cities, construcuted from 
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“scratch,” circumvent the complexities of socio-economic and political spaces. 
Referencing Deleuze, Greenfield ties these greenfield developments theoretically to “any-
space-whatever” (Greenfield Loc 254). No wonder, he says, that these corporations and 
managers can speak so glibly of efficiency, optimization, and seamlessness when they 
can ideologically bracket the inconveniences and difficulties of real cities (Greenfield 
Loc 266). Similarly, the time horizons of smart cities unfairly lay claim to an “any-time-
in-the-future,” whereby the utopic promises made today are just around the corner, but 
constantly fail to arise. Such constant delay curiously does little to dampen the hype and 
promises of smart cities, Greenfield remarks. Indeed, he jesters that “the smart city is 
something that can and will always be redefined as its enthusiasts deem necessary, and so 
remain forever just beyond our reach” (Greenfield Loc 380-393), always enticing, forever 
utopic, but surely “just around the corner!” 
This tendency towards oversimplifying the challenges our cities face and 
overpromising the ease of solutions continues on several other fronts, Greenfield argues. 
He critiques these corporations’ claims that their platforms will be “open” to the public, 
when they are by no means open-source software, or free for all to download and edit as 
they see fit (Greenfield Loc 566-611). Furthermore, the technology that is available “has 
to be staged in any-space-whatever” given how simple the assumptions behind the 
technology are (Greenfield Loc 420). “Only by proposing to install generic technologies 
on generic landscapes in a generic future can advocates avoid running afoul of the knotty 
complexities that crop up immediately any time actual technologies are deployed in 
existing places” (Greenfield Loc 420), Greenfield says.  
 Greenfield especially eschews the “unreconstructed logical positivism” 
(Greenfield Loc 432) that he deems rampant throughout corporate smart city rhetoric, 
whereby the world is assumed to be “perfectly knowable, its contents enumerable and 
their relations capable of being meaningfully encoded in the state of a technical system, 
without bias or distortion” (Greenfield Loc 443). Greenfield finds this logic to be 
incompatible with “the messy realty of all known information-processing systems, the 
human individuals and institutions that make use of them and, more broadly, with the 
world as we experience it” (Greenfield Loc 480). Indeed, he employs a curious metaphor 
of cities as tragic (Greenfield Loc 492) given how multiple people and multiple 
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communities hold differing and sometimes contradictory conceptions of the good—
messiness that gives a flare to cities that we all intimately know, but corporate schmooze 
conveniently forgets. 
Greenfield’s most weighty invective against the current and dominant narrative of 
smart cities—one, again, controlled largely by for-profit, large corporations—is that it 
serves the neoliberal political economy. Greenfield blankly states that “virtually without 
exception, the canonical smart cities are predicated on the logic of neoliberalism” 
(Greenfield Loc 875). If by neoliberalism one means that citizen services should be 
privatized, that public oversight of private activities should be minimized, that the best 
utilitarian outcome of economic activity rests upon “frictionless global trade,” and that 
taxes should be reduced as low as possible to support primarily a juridical apparatus and 
military that protects private property rights, then the smart city is a close rhetorical 
match, Greenfield argues (Greenfield Loc 875). He locates each of these criteria in the 
practices and discourse of Songdo, Masdar City, and Living PlanIT’s marketing 
materials. With its “organic capacity for data-driven process optimization, its seamless 
interweaving of public and private action and its organization for the convenience of 
administration,” the smart city and its accouterments can be interpreted as “the most 
recent additions to the armature of enticements and amenities a city must offer in order to 
be considered a credible contender as a destination” for globalized capital (Greenfield 
Loc 935).  
But even someone as critical as Greenfield can see potential benefits of smart city 
interventions, just so long as they unfold through alternative narratives than the one for-
profit corporations have written. And voicing those alternatives is incredibly important he 
says, given the weight of discourse on our future actions (Greenfield Loc 1329-1365). “I 
hope we can agree,” he implores, “that ‘the smart city’ is a specific rhetorical move 
within a much larger space of potential” (Greenfield Loc 1377). He asks his readers to 
explore, develop, and advocate for “far more interesting potentials locked up in 
networked technologies” (Greenfield Loc 1377), and if one cannot yet think of potentials, 
at the very least ask critical questions that invite all actors to converse about equity, 
power, and access (Greenfield Loc 1389). 
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3.2 Peer-Reviewed Articles 
 
 In addition to the three primary monographs in the smart city academic literature, 
there have been two primary special issues from respected journals that relate to urban 
planning and management. These two journals have been divided by their general 
dispositions toward smart cities—optimistic and cautious interpretations. 
3.2.1 Optimistic Interpretations 
 
 There have been two special journal issues in the fields of urban studies and 
regional planning that address smart cities. The first one, published in 2011, was the 
Journal of Urban Technology’s “Creating Smart-er Cities,” edited by Mark Deakin. 
While individual articles may have been published sparsely before then, recall that no 
monograph or special issue had yet appeared.  
From the diverse foci of these collected research articles and the few authors 
involved (two scholars co-authored four of the six research articles), one can infer that in 
2011 the scholarly community had just begun to initiate a conversation specifically on 
smart cities. The first article, “Creating Smart-er Cities: An Overview” by Sam Allwinkle 
and Peter Cruickshank, tries to define what a “smart city” actually is in light of the recent 
2009 “Conference on Creating Smart(er) Cities” (Allwinkle and Cruickshank 1). Their 
initial list of cities that have chosen to call themselves “smart” leaves one wondering 
what exactly the word means—San Diego, Ottawa, Kyoto, Bangalore, Edinburgh. 
Because even the most experienced, globally-minded urban planner would fail to spot the 
“smart connection” among these cities, Allwinkle and Cruickshank initially posit that the 
term is simply a “self-congratulatory tone” cities adopt to make themselves stand apart 
globally (Allwinkle and Cruickshank 1). But the authors do note that something different 
can be found in urban planning and cities around the globe, pointing to “ICT 
infrastructures, underpinned by a new generation of mobile technologies, connected 
devices, network platforms, and associated software” (Allwinkle and Cruickshank 2).  
 As an introductory primer on both the emerging smart city conversation in general 
and the five research articles that follow, Allwinkle and Cruickshank’s article clearly 
understands that the pragmatic applications of those ICT infrastructures remain 
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unresolved. On the one hand, they can imagine a “worst-case nightmare scenario of a city 
dominated by the entrepreneurial values of the elite few,” and on the other hand, they can 
foresee a more “progressive alternative” that uses information technology, not to shore-
up the entrepreneurial values of the city, but rather to “undergird” a community’s social, 
communal, and environmental qualities” (Allwinkle and Cruickshank 4). This tension in 
the purpose of the smart city will continue in academic scholarship. Ultimately, 
Allwinkle and Cruickshank argue that the smart city, in contrast to previous versions of 
technologically-enhanced urban systems (the intelligent city, the wired city, etc.) is about 
people. It establishes a platform for civic and communal engagement and becomes an 
“exercise in liberal democratic governance, or civitas” (Allwinkle and Cruickshank 9). 
Renewed civitas—engaging individuals through new channels of governance and 
participation—seems to have been a predominant focus of early scholarship on smart 
cities, as evidenced by some of the remaining research articles in this special issue. 
Indeed, the following article, “The IntelCities Community of Practice” by Mark Deakin, 
Patrizia Lombardi, and Ian Cooper, analyzes a joint government-academic-industry 
initiative in enhancing government services using ICTs. The authors wonder if the 
information transfer enabled by informal networks of social capital can be amplified 
through digital technologies (Deakin et al. 18). They argue to the affirmative, pointing to 
what they deem a successful case study of “virtual organization whose customization is 
co-designed to manage the learning needs and knowledge-generating requirements of a 
technological platform” (Deakin et al. 35). Consisting of an e-learning module, a 
knowledge-management system, and a digital library, the IntelCities Community of 
Practice case study demonstrated how the intricacies of bureaucratic governance might 
become more easily understandable, accessible, and subject to democratic monitoring 
through online portals. While this subject matter could simply be reduced to a matter of 
digital design, Deakin et al. give voice to how the “big data” of sensored cities might be 
accessibly presented to the general public, rather than elite managers who keep the data 
unto themselves. 
George Kuk and Marijn Janssen extend this analysis of improving government 
services through digital applications in their essay “The Business Models and 
Information Architectures of Smart Cities.” They believe that smart cities will necessitate 
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a shift in how governments extend services to their citizenry, foregoing what we may call 
person-to-person meetings in exchange for the ease of remote access and integrated 
online portals. The goal, they argue, is to meet the 21st century demands of a connected 
citizenry: “the integration of various products into a single service, the reuse and real-
time availability of information, easy interaction, and discussion with government 
bodies” (Kuk and Janssen 39). Looking to case studies in the Netherlands, where some 
government actors have explored web-based business models for extending services, the 
authors believe that mapping possible pathways for migrating public data, information, 
and services to digital platforms (away from filing cabinets and the harder-to-access 
individuals in government who hold that knowledge) is the most important issue facing 
governments today (Kuk and Janssen 40). 
The last three articles of the Journal of Urban Technology special issue on smart 
cities concern themselves with interwoven and complimentary relationships among 
universities (intellectual capital), industry (wealth creation), and governments (civil 
society). This notion of a “triple-helix” framework of smart cities implies early 
scholarship’s focus not so much on the defining feature of smart cities today—nascent 
ICTs that mobilize data in real-time to change urban processes and functions—but rather 
the effects of that ICT upon actors intricately involved in urban spaces.  
Loet Leydesdorff and Mark Deakin first propose this model in their essay “The Triple-
Helix Model of Smart Cities: A Neo-Evolutionary Perspective,” with the two final 
articles in the special issue building upon their key metaphor. Leydesdorff and Deakin 
maintain the earlier authors’ theme of focusing upon the softer aspects of smart cities, 
asking only thereafter how the hard aspects, namely ICT, can accentuate networks of 
social, entrepreneurial, and governmental capital. Much in the vein of scholarship of 
Richard Florida, they argue that “cities can be considered as densities in networks among 
at least these three relevant dynamics: that is, in the intellectual capital of universities, 
the industry of wealth creation, and their participation in the democratic government 
which forms the rule of law in civil society” (Leydesdorff and Deakin 61). If ICT can do 
anything to help these cities become “smarter,” it would do so by “intensifying” existing 
modes of potential interaction (Leydesdorff and Deakin 56). Ultimately, however, 
Leydesdorff and Deakin reiterate repeatedly that the “cultural development” necessary 
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for creating permanently “smarter” cities “is not a spontaneous product of market 
economies, but a product of the policies, academic leadership, and corporate strategies 
that need to be carefully constructed as part of an urban regeneration program” 
(Leydesdorff and Deakin 59). 
 The final two articles of the special issue from the Journal of Urban Technology 
speak about smart cities from the viewpoints of urban economists. Peter Cruickshank, in 
“SCRAN: The Network,” explains how integral ICT now is to “the development of 
cities” and to leveraging “social and environmental capital as measures of the 
competitiveness of cities” (Cruickshank 83). His analysis of the Smart Cities Regional 
Academic Network (SCRAN) as a community of practice seeks to demonstrate how the 
“triple-helix model of smart cities” might fuel economic development and 
competitiveness in the future.  
 Similarly, Andrea Caragliu et al. in their essay “Smart Cities in Europe” argue 
that, according to their statistical analysis of variables contributing to sustained economic 
development, ICT—and the triple-helix interactions it can facilitate and amplify—is 
“positively correlated with urban wealth” (Caragliu et al. 65). Acknowledging that, in 
2011, “the label ‘smart city’ is still, in our opinion, quite a fuzzy concept” (Caragliu et al. 
67), they proffer what they see as a more definitive one: “We believe a city to be smart 
when investments in human and social capital and traditional (transport) and modern 
(ICT) communication infrastructure fuel sustainable economic growth and a high quality 
of life, with a wise management of natural resources, through participatory governance” 
(Caragliu et al. 70). Signaling possible tension within the academic and journalist actor 
network, Caragliu et al. explicitly cast doubt on neoliberal concerns with smart cities. 
They note that, “although caveats on the potential risks associated with putting an 
excessive weight on economic values as the sole driver of urban development may be 
worth noting, the data actually shows that business-oriented cities are indeed among 
those with a satisfactory socio-economic performance” (Caragliu et al. 68). 
 
3.2.2 Cautious Interpretations 
 
 If the 2011 special issue on smart cities from the Journal of Urban Technology 
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seemed to have enthusiastically embraced the smart city as a lens for understanding how 
cities develop inconclusive social and economic capital (and perhaps environmental 
capital), then the other special issue on smart cities, published in 2015, offers a cautious, 
more reserved exploration of its possibilities and a frank discussion of its dangers. Susan 
Christopherson and Amy Glasmeier, the editors of the smart city special issue for the 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, set the stage with their “Thinking About Smart 
Cities.” A telling quote from Glasmeier and Christopherson portends what we will see in 
the following eight articles and, in general, the broad skepticism—whether cautious or 
outspoken—from a few peer-reviewed academics: 
Although the authors in this issue approach the subject of smart cities from 
very different angles, they generally agree that smart city technologies are 
ill-suited to solving the problems that lie at the heart of improving the 
quality of urban life. Poverty is not on the agenda of smart city planners. 
They may solve traffic problems, but it is not clear how they will 
regenerate failing schools or find ways to include neighbourhoods facing 
disinvestment. The contradiction between the promise of smart cities and 
its limited policy scope is aptly demonstrated in one of the most celebrated 
smart cities, Rio de Janeiro. The city, with its control centre filled with 
wall size computer monitors, can perhaps use forecasts of threatening 
weather to send out warnings of storm intensity thus leading to speedier 
evacuation. What it does not address is the question of why people build 
housing in such high-risk environments and what it would take to change 
this behaviour. In this instance, at least, smart city technologies deal with 
symptoms rather than the disease. (Glasmeier and Christopherson 6) 
 That skepticism finds full voice in the first full essay of the collection, “The 
‘Actually Existing Smart City’” by Taylor Shelton, Matthew Zook, and Alan Wiig. The 
authors largely wish to situate the emergence of smart cities in a theoretical history. 
Against the claim that the smart city might be rationalist, neutral, scientific development, 
they remind us that “smart cities are not, by practically any stretch of the imagination, 
new,” referencing a long tradition of rational, urban science sweeping in to save the day 
(Shelton et al. 14). Indeed, in homage to a persistent argument among astute academics, 
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Shelton et al. note that “planners and engineers have sought to make the study and 
management of cities more scientific for over a century” (Shelton et al. 14). 
 Theoretically, they see smart cities operating in a world of neoliberalism, where 
cities must adopt strategies for “economic growth in an era of austerity” (Shelton et al. 
16). Thus, the smart city is a “means of territorial competitiveness, a way of attracting 
both capital and labour to cities” (Shelton et al. 16). Thus, as with any neoliberal policy, 
there will be “winners” and “losers.” “Whatever it means for a city to be ‘smart’,” they 
say, “it is also readily apparent that not all spaces of the city will be equally smart, 
meaning that smart cities will privilege some places, people and activities over others” 
(Shelton et al. 15). Finally, they fault the central tenet of the smart city—the collection of 
data—since “data are socially constructed, and different forms of data allow for 
competing representations of place” (Shelton et al. 18). While the authors do 
acknowledge the “alternative possibilities opened up by these new forms of data-driven 
governance” (Shelton et al. 22), their article leans more heavily towards the proclamation 
that much of the smart city discourse—from corporations and cities—is quite shallow. 
 They are not the only authors to say so. Rob Kitchin, in “Making Sense of Smart 
Cities: Addressing Present Shortcomings,” pegs smart cities’ theoretical genealogy to 
managerial neoliberalism. He states that “the smart city is understood to be the 
technological version of a sequence of neoliberal-infused new urban visions, including 
competitive cities, creative cities, sustainable cities, resilient cities and green cities” 
(Kitchin 133). In addition to interjecting certain discourses into the public conversation 
(entrepreneurialism, global competition, efficiency, etc.), neoliberalism also obscures 
certain discourses, with Kitchin noting that the current smart city discourse, as 
promulgated by companies and cities, leaves unquestioned and untouched issues such as 
panoptic surveillance, technocratic and corporate forms of governance, technological 
lock-ins, profiling and social sorting, anticipatory governance, control creep, the 
hollowing out of state provided services, widening inequalities and dispossession of land 
and livelihoods (especially on green field sites)” (Kitchin 132).  
 And another article in the Glasmeier and Christopherson collection largely 
concurs: “Critical Interventions into the Corporate Smart City” by Robert G. Hollands. 
As with Shelton et al.’s neoliberal critique, Hollands spots an ideology, left unspoken, 
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beneath the corporate-driven smart city movement—the privatization of public space that 
becomes the playground for corporate management and advertising (Hollands 68). 
Furthermore, Hollands sees a smart city rhetoric that suggests its urban solutions can only 
be delivered “through a corporate vision of smartness, in conjunction with an 
entrepreneurial form of urban governance (Harvey, 1989) and a largely compliant and 
accommodating citizenry (Gabrys, 2014)” (Hollands 62). Hollands attributes 
corporations’ smart city fix to the projection that it’s an industry worth $20-40 billion, 
annually (Hollands 66). Thus, he fears the emergence of what Michelle Provoost calls a 
“neo-liberal urban utopia” (Hollands 67). Hollands is also critical of public-private 
partnerships, asking “who gains and who loses through such arrangements” (Hollands 
69). Finally, he notices a glaring omission of “serious urban problems like poverty, 
inequality and discrimination” (Hollands 69) in the current discourse of smart cities. 
 Much as Kicos Komninos spoke in 2014 of smart city ICT as the addition of 
another “layer” to the urban ecosystem, so too do Chiraq Rabari and Michael Storper 
treat these new, advanced ICTs as the addition of a “digital skin” upon the physical urban 
fabric (Rabari and Storper 27). According to them, “the digital skin of cities consists of 
the widespread implantation of sensors into urban and household environments, together 
with ubiquitous mobile broadband communication technologies that can transmit both 
deliberate communications and automated user data” (Rabari and Storper 28).  
 Rabari and Storper catalogue what they see as severe deficiencies of smart city 
discourse thus far: the hyperbolic—and discredited—technological rationalism peddled 
by smart city corporations (Rabari and Storper 34); the failure of cybernetic rhetoric to 
recognize the spontaneous “messiness” described so poetically by Jane Jacobs (Rabari 
and Storper 35); the technologically enabled threats against liberal democracies (Rabari 
and Storper 35); the “weak ties” of digital interaction (Rabari and Storper 37); and the 
opacity of selective algorithms that determine what is “useful” data and what is not 
(Rabari and Storper 39). While they acknowledge the potential benefits of an urban 
digital skin, Rabari and Storper worry that smart city ICT inescapably operates within, 
and exacerbates, a world of uneven development (Rabari and Storper 40). 
 While Rabari and Storper and Shelton et al. are frugal with optimistic objections, 
Hollands ended his article on a light, cautiously hopeful note. The remaining authors of 
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this special collection are more liberal their optimism. The two theoretically optimistic 
authors are Robert Goodspeed in his “Smart Cities: Moving Beyond Urban Cybernetics 
to Tackle Wicked Problems” and Luís Carvalho in “Smart Cities from Scratch? A Socio-
Technical Perspective.” Each of these authors takes to heart Gasmeier and 
Christopherson’s recognition that “we can’t just lend critique to the situation. We have to 
be willing and able to get in, roll up our sleeves and discover how new applications and 
technologies can be used to genuinely improve the quality of urban life.” After 
dismissing the corporate-driven smart city, Hollands argues for alternative, citizen-
empowered smart city initiatives. 
 Goodspeed concurs with this cautious optimism, demonstrating how smart cities 
can tackle “wicked problems” by eschewing the urban cybernetics of corporate-driven 
smart city solutions, and instead turning to local innovation and stakeholder participation. 
Indeed, these authors see people as fundamental to smart cities, since they subscribe to 
what Goodspeed identifies as a “sociotechnical theory of action,” which proposes an 
“ensemble view of technology.” “According to this perspective,” he says, “a smart city is 
not defined by IT alone, but also by the use of IT artefacts (such as databases, sensors and 
networks) embedded within broader organizational and social contexts” (Goodspeed 81). 
Those contexts invite scholars, planners, and communities to explore how ICT fits their 
local needs and cultural practices. Instead of global corporations peddling the same 
technology to cities and inhabitants across six continents, Goodspeed foresees a “place-
based creative milieu to spark development of effective use of IT to address [context-
specific] urban problems” (Goodspeed 87, emphasis added).  
 Lastly, these admittedly wicked and sticky aspects of urban politics and social 
processes are given full attention in Luís Carvalho’s article, in which he also employs a 
socio-technical lens to map both the drawbacks and potential promises of smart cities. He 
is particularly concerned about all of the technical, social and political processes that 
contribute to a radical shift in urban living. He fears that the greenfield developments of 
Songdo, Masdar City, and PlanIT Valley bypass the social and political milieu, which 
makes their actual physical construction quicker but stymies their spatial adoption in 
social and political circles. Indeed, his closer look at PlanIT Valley and Songdo reveal an 
eventual collapse in social and political support, precisely because the smart technologies 
	   59	  
were contrived in a top-down manner. What is perhaps more appropriate are 
“technological transitions,” which “unfold through non-linear co-evolutionary processes 
between technological, social, political, and economic domains, taking place over long 
periods of time” (Carvalho 46). These changes stew in small “niches” (Carvalho 46), 
where innovations are cared to by people on the ground, including citizens and 
entrepreneurs. Key to the incubation of these innovative technologies are 1) technological 
learning, or the fine-tuning and implementation of new practices; and 2) societal 
embedding, or the adoption of new technology (Carvalho 47). Only then can new ICT 
solutions challenge, disrupt, and eventually replace outmoded urban regimes (Carvalho 
57). 
 The remaining two articles of this special issue from Regions, Economy and 
Society forego questioning the validity of the smart city and instead jump right into the 
analysis of case studies, offering an urban planner’s perspective on the implications of 
smart city ICT (whereas the authors of the special issue from the Journal of Urban 
Technology were more interested in ICT’s implications for municipal managerialism). 
Dietmar Offenhuber, in “Infrastructure Legibility—A Comparative Analysis of Open311-
Based Citizen Feedback Systems,” investigates how mobile apps might impact citizens’ 
engagement with municipal governance. Subscribing to Kevin Lynch’s notion of 
legibility, Offenhuber claims that no matter how interactive or well-designed a 
governance-focused app may be, citizens will not be able to participate unless they 
possess a reciprocal familiarity with the urban environment in which they live and to 
which that app ought to respond (Offenhuber 96). This condition forms the theoretical 
bedrock of the case study analysis. And it rings true in the findings—“most [app enabled] 
reports are submitted in the reporter’s own neighborhood” (Offenhuber 107), leading to 
the plausible conclusion that ICT enables more citizen engagement with the 
environments they know best.  
 P. Christopher Zegras et al. draw a similar conclusion in “Tracing a Path to 
Knowledge? Indicative User Impacts of Introducing a Public Transport Map in Dhaka, 
Bangadesh.” Here the authors explore how ICT enabled apps on smartphones do not so 
much distract users, as cantankerous interpretations of technology might lead us to 
believe, but instead compliment residents of Dhaka, Bangladesh’s ability to explore their 
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home city. With a “loosely organized and weakly regulated system of approximately 
7000 buses and minibuses” in one of the largest megacities in the world, these subaltern 
scholars wondered how the smartphone—“a portable, high-powered personal computing, 
communication and sensing device with data and Internet connectivity”—might be 
deployed to “empower people in their urban environment” (Zegras et al. 114). Zegras and 
team geolocated the movements and routes of these 7000 buses and developed an app-
based schematic bus map, “incorporating the design suggestions derived from on-the-
street interviews” (120). Ultimately, the authors see this as an example of and express 
their hope towards the smart city being a movement that employs data to generate 
knowledge for the public good (Zegras et al. 125). 
 
3.3 Rhetorical Findings—Assumptions, Expressions, & Basic Entities 
Recognized 
 
Like the “Rhetorical Findings” section for corporations, here I have tabulated my 
rhetorical findings of academic actors. In the primary table, the rhetoric of each acdemic 
actor has been assessed according to four key questions:  
1. What are the basic entities recognized in this actor’s discourse? 
2. What assumptions are made about the composition of or the processes that 
constitute cities? What is assumed to be “natural” about urban space? 
3. Who are the agents in this actor’s rhetoric, and what power (or lack thereof) are 
they imbued with? What are their goals, or, alternatively, what might a powerless 
agent receive? 
4. What are the key rhetorical devices, words, themes, and concepts employed by 
this actor when describing the smart city? 
Note in the first table that I have assessed the entire special issue of each journal instead 
of each author(s) in those journals, given their common and overlapping themes. 
 In the second table, I have assessed each academic actor according to whether or 
not he/she/they take a neoliberal approach to smart cities or a citizen empowerment 
approach. I make the case that these are the two primary foci throughout the academic 
literature on smart cities. Note, too, that some actors are identified as subscribing to both. 
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It is these actors who I believe display the most balanced and nuanced perspectives on 
smart cities, their drawbacks, and their possibilities.  
 Lastly, the third table specifies whether an actor has a negative, positive, or 
cautious outlook on smart cities, and correlates that outlook with the pilot projects 
analyzed in his/her/their respective article. For those actors who seem to move across a 
spectrum of interpretation of the smart city, I have coded their outlook with two 
selections. For example, an actor who begins his/her/their article expressing concern and 
skepticism about the rhetoric of corporate actors, but ends the article exploring alternative 
possibilities for citizens, might be said to take a “cautious / positive” stance.  
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Table	  3.1:	  Rhetorical	  Analysis	  of	  Key	  Smart	  City	  Academic	  Actors	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Many academic actors move beyond the myopia of corporations to include 
individual citizens and communities in entities recognized. Recall that most corporations 
spoke reductively of society, and when residents were mentioned, it was often in the 
context of consumption for their smart homes. I argue that these academic actors’ 
conception of the city are more nuanced, with most actors recognizing that urban space is 
contested. Corporations are often portrayed as seeking profits, but some academic actors 
recognize that corporations can indeed provide useful tools that democratically charged 
citizens decide to deploy on their terms (not vice versa). Lastly, many of these academic 
actors themselves bring an awareness of rhetoric and discourse to their scholarship. When 
emphasizing specific themes, one notices a focus both on neoliberalism and citizen 
empowerment. 
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The two predominant foci of academic actors seems to be neoliberalism and 
citizen empowerment. Some scholars construe the smart city as simply the next move of 
neoliberal socio-economics, whereby public space is privatized or, worse, that privatized 
space becomes reserved for the economic and social elite. Other academic actors, 
however, tend to interpret the smart city as a suite of technologically-enabled grass root 
tools that might empower democratic activism. They thus speak of the smart city as a 
means to empower ordinary citizens. A few scholars’ writings cross the spectrum of 
interpretations, recognizing the neoliberal proclivities of current smart city discourse and 
practice, but holding on to a hope that the power of its tools might ultimately reside with 
the citizenry. 
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 Ultimately, an actor’s stance on a smart city can be read as negative, positive, or 
cautious. Of course, some actors sway between two dispositions, often beginning on a 
cautious tone, but carefully migrating towards tepid optimism of smart cities’ possibilities 
for everyday citizens.  
 I have correlated academic actors’ overarching dispositions with a catalogue of 
the smart city pilot projects addressed in their respective essays. I have tabulated the four 
most common pilot projects mentioned in this academic literature, which also happens to 
be the quintessential smart city pilots one might hear or read about in more casual 
conversations on smart cities. Another category is “Other,” which might include one of 
the hundreds, if not thousands, self-declared smart city projects around the world that has 
unfortunately received little press compared to the four more successfully marketed ones. 
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A revelatory finding is that all but one of the actors who adopt positive interpretations of 
smart cities draw upon Other pilot projects in their essays. Conversely, those actors who 
adopt hardline, negative views of smart cities tend to focus exclusively on the four most 
popular (and most derided) smart city pilot projects. When those actors with negative 
dispositions toward smart cities do address Other pilot projects, this material, in my 
estimation, tends to be shallow and often focuses on projects implemented by large 




	   In this section, I seek to expand my rhetorical findings with the underlying theory 
I sense in these academic actors—neoliberalism. With the help of it and a few other 
theories explained in my “Theory” section, I seek to connect dots about the motives, 
ideologies, and assumptions lying behind the analyses of these academic actors. 
 If I had to identify a common theme throughout much of the academic discourse 
above, it would be caution and concern. That is, many of the authors above, especially in 
regards to the monograph authors and the writers in the Regions, Economy and Society, 
express concern about the discourse and intent behind “canonical” smart cities, and try to 
preempt that rhetoric with cautious explorations of better narratizations of what the smart 
city could be.  
 This caution arises from many authors’ understanding of and appeal to the theory 
of neoliberalism. As seen in the table in the rhetorical findings section above, a majority 
of the articles I summarized in the literature review steep at least part of their analysis in 
neoliberalism. Given the money to be made and the accrued value of the infrastructure 
that could potentially be replaced with ICT and sensors, these smart city observers and 
researchers have legitimately found similarities between the discourse of smart cities and 
the discourse of neoliberalism.  
 Most of these critics pay homage to David Harvey and Neil Brenner, if not 
explicitly by name, then certainly in the concepts they employ or the references they 
make in their bibliographies. Harvey, in his definitive guide to neoliberalism (2005), 
explains that “neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic 
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practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state 
is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” 
(Harvey, A Brief History 2, emphasis added). Neoliberalism, Harvey recounts, festered 
and grew in a few geographic locales; but through free trade and global finance, 
especially debt-issuance and its attendant debt-restructuring, neoliberalism became the 
privileged strategy of the global economy. Harvey declares its true status when he says 
that “neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse” (Harvey, A 
Brief History 3). And as I have made clear I hope in the theory section of my thesis, 
discourse matters, literally.  
 Harvey’s theory of neoliberalism, then, could actually explain the smart city 
movement on two levels. First, because neoliberalism is now a global discourse, states, 
and increasingly rather cities, must compete against each other in the publicly-financed 
recruitment of global capital. What better way to recruit multinational corporations than 
to claim that your city is “smart,” lubricated by the wheels of digitalization and 
information and community technology? Given the ever-uphill battle against falling rates 
of return, relocating to cities built upon an infrastructure that boosts worker 
productivity—that is, where everyone is an entrepreneur, mobilizing every second as a 
means to produce and innovate—makes all the more sense. But just as entrepreneurs 
must compete against each other in the marketplace, so, too, must cities now compete 
against each other on the global stage of recruiting corporate headquarters and regional 
offices, which wander the world like itinerant pan-handlers, constantly in search of the 
best deal.  
 Second, neoliberalism might suggest that the smart city movement is simply 
another iteration of the “financialization of everything” (Harvey, A Brief History 33). 
And so, when Anthony Townsend recounts that the smart city and internet of things (IoT) 
markets could total $650 billion annually by 2020, and when McKinsey and Company 
reminds us a smart grid in the United States could potentially generate an annual value of 
$130 billion by 2019 (Booth et al. 4), and when another McKinsey and Company study 
speculates that big data applications in Europe alone could become a $250 billion per 
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annum industry (Li et al. 11), it is no surprise to discover why the likes of IBM, Siemens, 
Cisco, Hitachi, Panasonic, and others have their mouths watering at replacing urban 
infrastructure. Their being at the table confirms a [possibly] dangerous trend in cities 
under the aegis of neoliberalism: there is no such thing, or no need for, public goods; 
everything must be privatized, everything should generate monetary value. 
 Neil Brenner echoes and extends Harvey’s concerns about neoliberalism and 
urban redevelopment in his research. In the co-authored essay of his edited collection 
Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe 
(2002), Brenner and Nik Theodore explore the basic premises of “actually existing 
neoliberalism.” The third premise of their argument relates to the first concern that I 
attached to Harvey’s understanding of urbanism, neoliberalism, and smart cities—the 
premise of uneven geographical development. I quote Brenner and Theodore at length:  
Each round of capitalist development is associated with a distinctive, 
historically specific geographical landscape in which some places, 
territories, and scales are systematically privileged over and against others 
as sites for capital accumulation. The resultant patterns of core-periphery 
polarization and sociospatial inequality exist at all spatial scales; their 
contours are never inscribed permanently upon the geographical landscape 
but are continually reworked through capital’s dynamic of uneven spatial 
development (Harvey 1982; Massey 1985). Uneven development is 
endemic to capitalism as an historical-geographical system: it is a key 
expression of capital’s relentless drive to mobilize particular territories 
and places as forces of production; it is a basic geographical medium 
through which intercapitalist competition and class struggle are fought 
out; and it is an evolving spatial-institutional scaffolding within which 
processes of devalorization and revalorization unfold (Smith 1984). 
(Brenner and Theodore 8) 
The smart city, then, is a site of privilege. ICT, sensors, and the efficient and effective 
infrastructure that they allow simply augment the capability of for-profit corporations to 
extract even more surplus value not only from people, but also from the systems that 
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support people, especially after neoliberal policies privatize those urban infrastructure 
systems.  
 The concern about uneven geographic development has been raised before in 
architecture and design, even without reference to the difficult task of clearly articulating 
the neoliberalization of cities. Mike Hodson and Simon Marvin (2013), in their essay 
“Transcendent Eco-cities or Urban Ecological Security?” cast a skeptical eye upon eco-
cities, wondering if eco-city design simply will not be subsumed into the current 
political-economic system. That is, eco-cities might allow dominant financial urban cores 
to continue growing economically and politically, all the while shielding the city from the 
adverse effects of global climatic and environmental change and social unrest. Eco-city 
design, then, becomes more akin to the superficial “bio-dome” design, isolating the city 
from the rest of the biosphere and global weirding (Marris 2011).  
 Hodson and Marvin use the phrase “ecologically secure gated communities” to 
describe this phenomenon, thereby suggesting that eco-city design currently has 
rhetorical and teleological similarities to the policy of “ecological security,” which 
governments speak of when seeking to “safeguard flows of ecological resources, 
infrastructure, and services at the national scale” (Hodson and Marvin 212). Urban 
ecological security, likewise, seeks to “reconfigure cities and their infrastructure in ways 
that help to secure their ecological and material reproduction—that is, their capacity to 
secure the resources (such as water and energy, but also waste disposal and protection 
from flooding) required to assure their continued economic and social development” 
(Hodson and Marvin 213). Thus, smart cities could be construed as the reconfiguration of 
urban infrastructure for the purposes of securing some cities’ positions as epicenters of 
global capital movement and investment. 
 To return to Brenner and Theordore’s essay, then, we begin to see why the 
scholars I reviewed above have construed the smart city as an apparatus of neoliberal 
experimentation. Calling attention to the “creative destruction” of neoliberalism, a 
dialectical tool for better understanding its spatial implications (Brenner and Theordore 
15-28), Brenner and Theodore note as an example “the privatization of infrastructural 
facilities” (Brenner and Theordore 27). With one swipe, this action reduces to ashes the 
public monopoly “for the provision of standardized municipal services” (Brenner and 
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Theordore 23); but from those ashes arise a moment of creation—“creation of privatized, 
customized, and networked urban infrastructures intended to (re)position cities within 
supranational capital flows” (Brenner and Theordore 23). So, yes, while the smart city is 
new, creative, innovative, and cutting-edge, behind that “smoke screen” lies an ideology 
that does not hold the public good close to heart; rather, its an ideology that privileges the 
corporate accumulation of capital. 
 As we see in the tables in the findings section, though, I do not think we can dwell 
solely on the pessimistic rhetoric informed by the awareness of neoliberalism from the 
smart city academic actors I reviewed in this paper. Obviously, many authors see an 
explicit benefit in smart city interventions that serve the public good. Alternatively, some 
authors first acknowledge the neoliberal dangers of the smart city narrative occupying 
public discourse today, but then cautiously express optimism that other narratives could 
overtake the dominant corporate narrative. This alternative narrative, according to my 
literature review above, focuses upon how ICT might empower citizens. 
 Whereas many of the corporate actors and pilot projects I analyzed (with the 
slight exception of FSST, I wish to maintain) spoke of smart city solutions managerially, 
whereby cities can be seen, monitored, and tweaked so long as “all” of the variables are 
known and connected to an ICT mainframe, these scholars who proposed countervailing 
narratives see ICT as “convivial tools” for ordinary citizens of urban spaces (Illich). If 
corporate actors see ICT as a means to accumulate capital in urban space (Merrifield’s 
process of urbanization), then these opposing interpreters of smart cities envision ICT, 
advanced analytics, and big data as a means to augment people’s social, economic, and 
cultural capital (Merrifield’s process of urbanism).  
 These networks of interaction, exchange, sharing, helping, learning, support, 
development, resisting, and adaptation already exist; ICT merely augments these existing 
networks’ capacity, resilience, and extent. In this light, the smart city narrative of citizen 
and democratic empowerment might very well be seen as a 21st century instantiation of 
what Ivan Illich meant by convivial society, “in which modern technologies serve 
politically interrelated individuals rather than managers” (Illich xii). The corporate smart 
city personifies Illich’s fear of overextended industrialism, which, draped across the 
fabric of urban space, “establishes a radical monopoly not only over resources and tools 
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but also over the imagination and motivational structure of people” (Illich 96). The 
citizen’s smart city, however, proposes the opposite, whereby democratically controlled 
tools of information and communication technology provide a platform for “autonomous 
and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their 
environment” (Illich 11).  
 With Songdo or PlanIT Valley or IBM’s quintessential smart city, Illich foresees 
a nightmarish hell, where, “enveloped in a physical, social, and psychological milieu of 
his own making, [man] will be a prisoner in the shell of technology, unable to find again 
the ancient milieu to which he was adapted for hundreds of thousands of years” (Illich 
54). Perhaps, though, the vision of a people’s smart city, as expressed by Townsend, 
Picon, Allwinkle and Cruickshank, Deakin et al., Kuk and Janseen, and many other 
authors above, will help urban residents to express their “right to the city,” their “right to 
participate in urbanity, the right to appropriate the city not merely as an economic unit, 
but as a home and as an expression of lived experience” (Merrfield 156, emphasis added).  
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4.0 Conclusion 
 
 The smart city, we have seen, is not necessarily one thing, force, movement, or 
idea. Rather, the smart city is a rhetorical space in which competing factions attempt to 
narrate their own conception of the smart city. These unique conceptions belie underlying 
assumptions, interests, and goals about cities and the entities / forces that comprise cities. 
By drawing attention to the importance of how rhetoric and discourse shape our 
perception of smart cities, and therefore our understanding of how information and 
communication technology might serve urban spaces, it is my hope that actors in this 
field might equip themselves with the knowledge to make informed decisions. 
 Why ought we be concerned with how cities develop? I find it helpful to recall a 
few pertinent statistics about cities: 
1) Cities are responsible for 60-70% of GHG emissions; their main sources of GHG 
emissions stem from the use of fossil fuels, for electricity generation, 
transportation, “energy use in commercial and residential buildings for lighting, 
cooking, space heating, and cooling,” industry, and waste disposal (United 
Nations Habitat, “Cities and Climate Change” vii).  
2) 90% of the world’s population growth will occur in developing countries (United 
Nations Habitat, “Cities and Climate Change” vii). 50% of the world’s population 
currently lives in urban areas, and 60% will by 2030 (UN Habitat, “Urbanization 
and Structural Transformation” 3). 
3) The cities of these developing countries will triple the size of their urban space 
between 2000 and 2030—an amount of land equal to all of the built, urban 
environment that existed in 2000 (Suzuki 1). 
4) In 2011, there were globally 447 cities with a population of 1,000,000 or more; by 
2020, there will be 527 (United Nations Habitat, “Cities and Climate Change” 2). 
5) In the built-out cities of developed nations, massive investments are nevertheless 
still needed in infrastructure. The American Society of Civil Engineers gives the 
US government a D+ rating on its current infrastructure, and argues that it needs 
to invest $3.6 trillion by 2020 (ASCE). 
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6) US residents emit, on average, 20 metric tones of CO2, whereas currently the 
Chinese emit 5 tons and the Indians emit 1 ton (Gleaser). To reach global, 
climatic stability, where planetary temperatures cease to rise precipitously year 
over year, scientists recommend per capita CO2 emissions of 4.5 tons. 
7) Cities account for 70% of global GDP, and 80% of future economic growth will 
occur in cities (UN Habitat, “Urbanization and Structural Transformation” 1). 
8) Finally, while demographers are unable to predict the world’s population in the 
future, it seems increasingly likely that the world’s population will stabilize some 
time between 2050 and 2100 (UN, “World Population 2015”), after which, we 
can assume, cities as they are will suffice for accommodating future humans. 
  
 To quote economist Paul Romer, we are literally building the cities that humanity 
will live in for centuries (Qtd. in Townsend 284). As I stated in the theory section of this 
thesis, rhetoric matters, in the most literal sense of that word. Rhetoric can be said to 
build cities. Rhetoric determines the contours, design, and functioning of any city. Given 
the importance of cities to our collective well-being and our species’ continued survival 
and development, urbanites should concern themselves with this ascendant rhetoric of 
“smartness” in order to steer it towards the most optimal and equitable outcome. 
 Just recently, for example, I attended the Housing + Health Summit in Austin, 
TX. During the lunch panel, the moderator Sherri Greenberg, who has conducted 
research into smart cities on behalf of IBM, stoked a conversation about smart cities. 
Between her and the three panelists—a Chair of a medical school, an advisor to a mayor, 
and a director at a local housing authority—I recorded at least five different conceptions 
of what constitutes a smart city, with the most reductive being “it is not a dumb city.” 
This hodgepodge of conflicting and sometimes nonsensical definitions is dangerous 
because, again, language matters. If our definitions of key concepts that increasingly hold 
sway in municipal governance are messy, will not our cities therefore develop 
haphazardly? Or worse, be co-opted by powerful entities who see this muddled rhetorical 
mess and capitalize upon it to serve their own interests? 
 To avoid such a pernicious outcome, I would like to conclude this thesis with a 
proposal for future research. I believe that urban researchers, enthusiasts, and hobbyists 
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need to build a shared database of all projects that purport to be smart cities. We need a 
common set of metrics that can be applied to each one. I have not done this, given that 
my research has focused exclusively thus far on reading the rhetoric of smart cities. But 
in order for the academy and the profession of urban planners to understand smart cities 
holistically—their pitfalls, their dangers, their promises, and their successes—we need to 
watch them all closely, measuring for certain important outcomes. Local researchers in 
the US, parts of Europe, Brazil, India, Korea, China, and Japan (places where I have seen 
most clearly the rhetoric and practice of smart cities) should all work to create profiles of 
every smart city project underway. Collected together, these profiles would provide a 
helpful, crowd-sourced site of information for businesses, public leaders, academics, and 
curious citizens and activists, all of whom are eager, I believe, to answer a key question: 
“what do smart cities actually do?” 
 Here I propose what these profiles should consist of. I cannot reiterate enough 
how much “rhetorical steam” the smart city currently has as a discourse. A search 
through an academic database for “smart city” will yield thousands of leads, whereas a 
search through Google’s search engine will yield millions. But that breadth of content 
does not necessarily translate into depth, of seriously wrestling with the implications and 
outcomes of existing smart city technology and pilot projects. Applying this same 
investigative rubric to instances of the smart city, I believe, would further the 
conversation.   
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Table	  4.1:	  Opportunities	  for	  Future	  Research	  
 
Research Questions Metrics Significance 
Do smart cities 
actually limit GHG 
emissions? 
CO2, Methane emissions, 
and other GHG emissions 
per capita. 
Determines whether or not smart 
cities are actually responding to core 
challenge: solving climate change, 
and creating carbon-neutral 
economies. 





impervious cover per 
capita; weighted density of 
smart city development. 
Clarifies how the smart city might 
impact land development trends. Is it 
more protective and efficient of 
critical nonhuman habitat? Or is it 
just as consumptive of land as 
American style sprawl? 
Does smart city 
technology improve 
the efficiency of 
city infrastructure? 
Water usage per capita; 
energy usage per capita; 
commuting behaviors; 
cost/benefit analysis of 
smart interventions in 
infrastructure. 
Identifies components of urban 
infrastructure that might actually be 
made more efficient through the use 
of advanced technology. The 
cost/benefit analysis of interventions 
is the most significant and important 
metric, I believe, for evaluating smart 
city technology. 




issues and urban 
spaces? 
Responses to a pre-set 
questionnaire gauging 
concern for the 
environment and 
awareness of urban 
networks. 
Given the “biofeedback” and 
instantaneous data-formation of 
smart cities, are smart city residents 
actually “smarter” about their 
surroundings? 




cohesion? Is it 
equitable? 
Household annual income; 
household annual 
expenses; education and 
demographic (race and 
age) statistics. 
As mentioned already, a danger of 
smart cities is that they become 
ecologically secure, gated 
communities. It is vital that the 
equity of smart cities be evaluated. If 
the smart city is not for everyone, 
then it will merely follow the 
trajectory of all previous techno-
utopias: failure. 
 
 When a smart city intervention occurs in an existing city, or when a smart city 
pilot project or development is constructed, researchers should be there immediately with 
this “toolkit” of questions. In order to properly evaluate the rhetorical claims (or chaos, 
depending on your perspective) of the smart city, the comparison should always be 
statistics for the same urban space before the smart city intervention. For example, if a 
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city is going to launch a demonstration site on the use of smart water meters and sensors, 
then per capita water usage should be known before it is measured after the intervention. 
Those prior metrics must be compared to post-intervention metrics. 
 I eagerly await researchers—ideally cadres of graduate students at urban planning 
and urban design programs throughout the world—devoting their time and resources to 
asking these questions. As I share in the table above, the most important metric to be 
applied to these questions is the cost/benefit analysis. “What is the actual cost of these 
technological interventions, and what are the measurable benefits?” we should ask.  
 When possible, I propose that a monetary value be attached to these measurable 
benefits. For example, if a smart city intervention removes more individually-owned 
automobiles from the road since software-enabled ride-sharing allows commuters to 
maximize seat space in existing cars, then that improved efficiency should be 
monetized—how do road maintenance costs improve since fewer cars are being used to 
shuffle people around? How much can we reduce highway expansion costs since we are 
beginning to maximize the efficiency of existing road infrastructure? How much money 
can each household on average redirect to other sectors of the economy since they are no 
longer purchasing their own vehicles (a significant cost, in regards to both fixed and 
variable capital)? If the dominant rhetoric propelling decision-making in regards to urban 
functions and environmental concern revolves mostly around money, then we should 
place equivalent monetary values on the ramifications of smart city interventions. 
 Based on my visits to smart city pilot projects in Japan, and based on existing data 
that supports this notion that technology can both improve the quality of life (both human 
and more-than-human) while decreasing humans’ adverse impact upon the environment 
(GHG emissions, land consumption, etc.), I find it hard to hide my excitement about 
smart city technology. I do believe that it is better and preferable to urban and exurban 
development as it occurred in the 21st century in North America and in countries that 
replicated the “American way.” I also believe that, despite the warnings and concerns 
from the academy about smart city technology, the discourse of  “cities being smart” or 
“getting smarter” and the suite of tools offered by corporations to accomplish that will 
continue to grow, until it becomes part of urban development’s hegemonic paradigm. 
Nevertheless, our job as researchers is to offer a neutral declaration on the effects, 
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impacts, and expected trajectories of smart city technology, and we cannot do that unless 
we measure interventions. While “theoretical analyses” have their place in our grappling 
with this new layer of infrastructure, they alone cannot evaluate this change in urban 
form and function entirely. Active monitoring and measuring tell the fuller story.  
 I am hopeful it will be a good story.  
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